Repercussions of Seattle additional duration: an article

It is no secret that our good friend Mike Snodin (Park Grove IP) has taken a keen interest in the Seattle Genetics reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Case C-471/14), so no readers of this weblog will be surprised that he has some further thoughts about this ruling which he is happy to share with us.  As Mike explains: 

I have a particular reason to welcome the judgement in Seattle Genetics.  This is because it validates an argument that I first proposed in an article published in Scrip Regulatory Affairs in October 2011 (discussed on the SPC Blog here), namely that the duration of SPC protection should (where relevant) be calculated upon the basis of the notification date of a "centralised" Marketing Authorisation -- and not the (earlier) date of the European Commission's decision to issue the MA.

 It is gratifying that the CJEU has validated another novel concept that I devised (the first being zero / negative term SPCs -– see this RAJ Pharma article from July 2007 and this SPC Blog post from 2011). However, it is disappointing to note that the CJEU's judgement in Seattle Genetics solely addresses the issue of SPC duration but does not comment upon the interpretation of other provisions of the SPC legislation that also rely upon the precise date ascribed to a MA.
With this in mind, I have published an article that, while noting the additional duration that should be awarded to certain SPCs (perhaps up to about 40% of all SPC applications for medicinal products), also discusses some potentially broader implications with respect to:-       the deadline for filing some SPCs;-       determining the date of certain national MAs; and-       determining the MA date for the purposes of Articles 3(b) and 3(d) (which are two of the four key provisions that determine entitlement to SPC protection).  Finally, the article mentions the battles that companies may face when trying to persuade certain national patent offices and courts to correct (by lengthening) the duration of SPCs already granted -- and points to a recent decision (discussed on the SPC Blog here) that may help to win those battles. My latest article may be viewed by clicking here. With two validated concepts under my belt, I am now keen to complete my hat-trick.  Indeed, there may already be an opportunity for this.  This is because another concept that I proposed (again relating to SPC duration, but this time based upon the Euratom treaty), although rejected by the UK IPO in the Genzyme case, would appear to be eminently arguable in the light of the CJEU’s decision in Merck Canada (C-555/13, see this Scrip Regulatory Affairs article from June 2014, as discussed on the SPC Blog here).  However, with only one additional day at stake for less than half of all SPCs in a handful of countries, I doubt that there will be sufficient commercial incentive for any applicant to vigorously pursue the relevant arguments.  Having said that, this is one occasion on which I would be delighted to be proved wrong!

Date fixed for Seattle ruling

The ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-471/14 Seattle Genetics (on which see earlier SPC Blog post here and JA Kemp post here) is now expected on Tuesday 6 October.

Seattle is a city that is famous for its coffee, always a good way to help wake you up -- but on 6 October the SPC community will need no wake-up call. We'll all be waiting expectantly for the CJEU to make its pronouncement.

Seattle Genetics: CJEU calls for an AG's Opinion

Our good friend Mike Snodin (Park Grove IP) has spotted that the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has indicated that the Advocate-General’s opinion in Case C-471/14 Seattle Genetics will be issued on 10 September 2015.  To remind readers, this is a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Oberlandesgericht Wien (Austria) which was made in October of last year, so it's proceeding fairly swiftly through the CJEU. The questions referred are:

Is the date of the first authorisation to place the product on the market in the Community pursuant to Article 13(1) of Regulation 469/2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products determined according to Community law or does that provision refer to the date on which the authorisation takes effect under the law of the Member State in question?

If the Court’s answer is that the date referred to in Question 1 is determined by Community law, which date must be taken into account — the date of authorisation or the date of notification?

Mike hypothesises that the call for an Advocate General's opinion must mean that the CJEU does not believe that the answers to the questions posed are either obvious or clearly deducible from existing case-law.

For further information see The SPC Blog's posts here (announcing the reference) and here (flagging an article by Mike Snodin).

Notification dates, (co)exclusivity, similar drugs, orphans and the FDA: a comment

Further to Marc Nevant's observations, posted on The SPC Blog yesterday (here), Mike Snodin -- whose article Marc cited -- has added some further comments of his own. Says Mike:

The EMA’s reliance upon the Notification Date for calculating periods (data exclusivity and orphan market exclusivity) running from the date of a MA is confirmed in the answer to question 12 in “EMA Procedural advice for users of the centralised procedure for generic/hybrid applications” (see this link).

The EMA’s practice on this point was the basis of one of the arguments in my article from October 2011. The legal basis for that practice is Article 297(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which is a point noted in my article from October 2014.

The decision in T-140/12 is fascinating, as it appears to mean that the (co-)exclusivity awarded to one product can effectively extend the period of (co-)exclusivity on the market for another, “similar” product. In this respect, that decision is similar to that in Depomed Inc. v U.S. Department of Health and Human Services et al., Case No. 1:12-cv-01592, where orphan exclusivity was awarded to a non-identical drug in circumstances where “clinical superiority” of that drug had not been demonstrated over an already approved, “similar” drug.

The FDA does not appear to be inclined to follow the ruling in Depomed (see this link), and so it will be very interesting to see what Teva does in respect of the ruling in T140/12 – and whether the CJEU will eventually get to rule on this aspect of orphan marketing exclusivities.

Thanks, Mike!

Determination of periods of regulatory exclusivity: grant date v notification again!

From our friend and reader Marc Nevant (French and European Patent Attorney, Cabinet Beau de Loménie, Paris) comes the following note, for which The SPC Blog offers its sincere thanks. Writes Marc:

I have recently come across Case T-140/12, a General Court of the European Union ruling in Teva v European Medicines Agency (EMA). In short, Teva sought an order to annul the EMA’s refusal to grant its application for marketing authorisation (MA) for imatinib Ratiopharm, a generic version of (Novartis's) orphan drug product imatinib (trade name Glivec), in so far as it concerned therapeutic indications for the treatment of chronic myeloid leukaemia (CML).

The matter is essentially about orphan drug exclusivity and the interpretation of Regulation 141/2000 on orphan medicinal products. There is, however, a parapraph in the decision that should be of interest for the readers of this blog. Paragraph 12 mentions that 

“Pursuant to Article 8 of Regulation No 141/2000, the period of market exclusivity enjoyed by the medicinal product imatinib, marketed under the commercial name Glivec, in so far as concerns the CML therapeutic indications — the original marketing authorisation for which took effect on 12 November 2001 — expired on 12 November 2011”.

It turns out that 12 November 2001 is the date of notification of the MA (the grant date being 7 November 2001). This suggests that the determination of periods of Regulatory Exclusivity for centrally approved products could be affected by the “grant date v notification date” debate, and further suggests (if the decision is transposed to SPC cases) that, for centrally approved products, the date of notification of the MA is de facto the date referred to in §1 of Article 13 of SPC Regulation 469/2009, as already argued at length by Mike Snodin (see e.g. the post on this blog of 30 October 2014).

Let’s hope that the judges in Seattle Genetics (on which see earlier posts here and here) will share this view!

The Court of Justice: who needs it? A new article

New has reached The SPC Blog of the latest publication by Mike Snodin of Park Grove IP (a copy of which can be viewed here). On this occasion, Mike’s article (“The CJEU – for supplementary protection certificates, who needs it?”) discusses the arguments for and against the use of Notification Date for “centralised” marketing authorisations (MAs) and explains why the arguments against, as typified by a decision of the Danish Patent Office, are fatally flawed.

Mike concludes that it is acte clair that the SPC legislation requires the use of the date of validity of a MA to calculate the duration of an SPC. How the date of validity is calculated will depend upon the type of MA involved – but for “centralised” MAs it will involve use of the Notification Date.

In the light of his analysis of the legislation, Mike concludes that it is not necessary for patent offices to refer this matter to the CJEU in order to accept arguments in favour of the use of the Notification Date.  Mike’s article was published too late to persuade the Oberlandesgericht Wien not to make a reference on this point. However, Mike hopes that his article will help the CJEU quickly grasp the key points of the matter. He also hopes that they will forgive the title that the publishers chose for his article!

Calculation of dates in Portugal: notification of MA

João Jorge (Raul-Cesar Ferreira) has kindly sent us some hot news from the Portuguese Intellectual Property Court in Case 457/12.7YHLSB, which is being published today although it was reflected even yesterday on the court's online database. This decision concerns the date used to calculate the term of SPC 474.

Takeda Pharmaceutical Company Ltd. filed the application for the SPC on 26/03/2012, having EP 1718641 as the base patent and based on the MA for azilsartan medoxomil -- Edarbi.  The marketing authorization (MA) for Edarbi was granted by Decision C(2011)9280 of 07/12/2011, with publication in the Official Journal of European Union dated 24/02/2012, where the date of notification to the owner is identified has being 09/12/2011, two days after the date of the Decision.

During prosecution, Takeda filed a note with the PTMO with their arguments in favour of using the Notification date (09/12/2011) instead of the Decision date (07/12/2011) for the calculation of the SPC expiry dates. This SPC was granted on 25/09/2012 with the duration being calculated using the Decision date. The Patent Office argument was the following: 

“The purpose of the present Official Communication is to inform that after analyzing the arguments filed on 06/06/2012 related to Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) 474, the date of the Marketing Authorization (MA) that is used to calculate the expiry date is, according to Article 13(1) of Regulation 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009, the date written in the MA, in this particular case 07/12/2011.”

With this, the expected validity end was 07/12/2026 instead of 09/12/2026.

After publication of the Decision from the PTMO, Takeda appealed from said Decision to the Portuguese Intellectual Property Court requiring that the date to be used in the calculation should be the date of the Notification.

The Court decision was based on the following most relevant reasons: 

“…the relevant date to determine the validity period of the certificate consists of the starting date of the marketing authorisation associated therewith. It is from that date that the medicament can start to be commercialized. This does not occur with the pronunciation of the marketing authorisation decision but with the effective validity of that authorisation”.

It further clarifies:

“It is provided in Article 297 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which replaces the Treaty Establishing the European Community, that decisions that are not a legislative act and mentioning a addressee are notified to him/her and producing effects upon that notification.

From this it results that the decision to grant a marketing authorisation only has effect from the notification date, for which reason the common practice is to make reference to it by publication in the Official Journal of the mention of the date of the decision and of the date of notification to its addressee.

It would not be understandable how an administrative act granting the authorisation for the practice of a fact could produce effects before its notification to the addressee and how the addressee could know that he/she may legitimately practise that fact without being aware of that decision”

Thus, this decision confirmed that the date to be considered in the calculation of the duration of a SPC is the date of notification of the decision. Briefly, the Court decided that:

* the decision of grant of a Marketing Authorisation has effect as from its date of Notification, not from the Decision date;

* the administrative act which grants an authorisation could not have effect before its applicant had been notified.

This decision is in agreement with the previous decision BL O/418/13 of the UKIPO [on which see Mike Snodin's earlier contribution on this blog here].

It is still to be seen what will be the understanding of the PTMO of this decision and if it will apply it (to future cases or, even, to previous cases) or if the PTMO will maintain its practice waiting for a referral to the CJEU on this matter.

Earlier news from was posted by João on The SPC Blog here this April.