Hold the Front Page: Royalty involved in SPC decision!

The CMS patent litigation team in London have provided a review of the Royalty Pharma decision (C650/17). Many thanks to Gareth Morgan, Natalie Coan and Hannah Rigby for their thoughts.  

On 30 April 2020, the CJEU ruled on the interpretation of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation in an action between the Royalty Pharma Collection Trust and the German Patent and Trademark Office (C-650/17) (“Royalty”).  

In its ruling, the CJEU in Royalty held that a product developed after the filing date of a patent following an independent inventive step but falling under the functional definition of said patent was not considered ‘protected’ under Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation. The case brings greater clarity after an uncertain line of case law following Medeva (C-322/10) in relation to what is ‘specified in the wording of the claim’. The CJEU in the Royalty ruling confirmed the test endorsed by the CJEU in  Gilead (C-121/17) by following the two pronged test but most notably added clarification by confirming that the term “core inventive advance” was not relevant to the interpretation of Article 3(a). Until now the CJEU had failed to offer a clear test for applying Article 3(a) but this decision has the effect of finally placing the interpretation of Article 3(a) on more stable ground.

Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation requires that a product be protected by a basic patent in force before an SPC may be granted in respect of it. Medeva introduced the concept of ‘specified in the wording of the claim’, although it was unclear what that really meant. A further layer of confusion appeared in the CJEU’s decision in Actavis (C-443/12) which stated that the product had to constitute “the core inventive advance of that patent”. That case related to Article 3(c) but the CJEU referred to the same test in Actavis (C-577/13) which related to Article 3(a). It was then unclear when exactly the core inventive advancement of the patent should be taken into consideration and whether it had replaced the Medeva test.

Arnold J sought some clarity on this point in his referral to the CJEU in Gilead. In his referral, Arnold J suggested that ‘protected by the patent’ should mean that the product must ‘embody the core inventive advance’ of the patent, replacing ‘specified in the wording of the claim’. The CJEU did not explicitly reject this proposal but confirmed that each active ingredient should (1) necessarily fall under the invention covered by the patent; and (2) be specifically identifiable in light of the information disclosed by that patent. Arnold J took this to mean that the patent’s technical contribution was relevant to the assessment. The UK Court of Appeal subsequently overturned Arnold J’s interpretation, replacing this with a simpler test of whether all components of the “product” were necessarily required by the language of the claim.

The confusion caused by pre-Gilead case law has however remained, leading to a number of referrals, including that of the German Federal Court in Royalty.

Royalty Pharma had applied for an SPC protecting sitagliptin on the basis of its patent claiming use of dipeptidylpeptidase IV inhibitors to lower blood glucose levels. Sitagliptin was developed after the filing date of the relevant patent. It is however a dipeptidylpeptidase IV inhibitor and was therefore covered by the functional definition in the patent’s claims.

The German Federal Court requested guidance as to whether a product is protected under Article 3(a) where:

1.       The product is not expressly referred to in the patent’s claims;

2.       The product is not considered the specific embodiment of the patent;

3.       The product was developed after the filing date of the patent; and

4.       The product was covered by a functional definition in the patent’s claims.

The CJEU held that Article 3(a):

“is to be interpreted as meaning that a product is protected by a basic patent in force within the meaning of this provision if it corresponds to a general functional definition used in one of the claims of the basic patent and necessarily relates to the invention protected by this patent, but without being individualized as a specific embodiment from the teaching of the patent, provided that it can be specifically identified, in light of all the information disclosed by said patent, by a person skilled in the art, on the basis of their general knowledge in the field, considered on the filing or priority date of the basic patent and the state of the art on that same date.”

This ruling follows the ruling in Gilead.

The CJEU’s clarification seems to have confirmed that the test for Article 3(a), in effect, equates to a question whether there has been an enabling disclosure of the product. The CJEU held that:

“Article 3(a) must be interpreted as meaning that a product is not protected by a basic patent in force within the meaning of that provision where, although that falling under the functional definition given in the claims of this patent, it was developed after the filing date of the application for the basic patent, at the end of an autonomous inventive step.”

The CJEU has therefore confirmed that the patentee of the basic patent must demonstrate that the skilled person could produce the product which is the subject of the SPC using only the common general knowledge and prior art, with no inventive activity.

The Royalty ruling confirms, and clarifies, the Gilead decision. It represents another nail in the ‘core inventive advance test’ coffin with respect of Article 3(a), and further demarcates the appropriate test for Article 3(a).  Notwithstanding the clarity offered on Article 3(a) new questions arise in respect of the compatibility of this ruling with the earlier Actavis case law on Articles 3(a) and 3(c), and also the extent to which any later independent inventive activity creates a new “product” for the purposes of SPC eligibility. 

No more launch at risk in France?

Recently, the Paris High Court decided for a preliminary injunction against the commercialization of Darunavir by Sandoz.  A copy of the decision is available here.  Matthieu Dhenne from Dhenne Avocat has kindly provided the below summary for the case. 

A recent decision of the Paris High Court (January 11, 2019) decided preliminary injunctions against the Darunavir commercialization by Sandoz (Prezista generic). The SPC was found to be presumably valid and thus infringed by Sandoz.  

The question was: how should we applied article 3(a) SPC Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009)?  We must beforehand recall that the CJEU has never ruled on how article 3(a) should be applied with respect to a Markush claim. Thus, should darunavir be considered as being “specified in the wording of the claims” (Medeva)? Or should we hold that the claim “relates, implicitly but necessarily and specifically“ to darunavir (Eli Lilly)? But maybe those questions are irrelevant since the claim is not a functional one? 

Firstly, the Paris High Court analyzed the CJEU case law about SPC and concluded that the Eli Lilly test was not applicable to a Markush claim:

“It should be noticed that, in Eli Lilly, the case concerned a functional claim, so that the CJEU insisted on a double condition of necessity and specificity. In the present case, the claims of the basic patent are structural and better allow the skilled person to determine in view of the claims whether the active compound protected by the SPC was covered by the basic patent.” 

Secondly, following the examination of the formula of claim 1 of the patent and the various meanings of the variable groups in this claim and some of the dependent claims, the Judge concluded that: 

“Thus darunavir is identified by the skilled person as being implicitly but necessarily and specifically protected by the EP’209 patent in view of the substituents identified in the claims, in keeping with the requirements of article 3(a) of the EC Regulation and of the CJEU case law.” 

Therefore, the judge considered that the defendant did not prove that the SPC was manifestly invalid. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction was ordered, under a 50,000 euro-penalty per violation of the injunction. The judge also ordered a seizure of the infringing drugs, as well as a product recall. 

The recent French case law (and the reform of nullity actions limitation period with PACTE Law?) send a clear sign to the drug manufacturers: launch at risk should now be avoided in France.

Thank you Matthieu!

An analysis of the CJEU’s ruling in Teva (C-121/2017) and a proposal for its implementation

Dr. Roberto Romandini of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich has published a MPI- Research Paper on Art. 3(a) Reg. 469/2009 that includes an analysis of CJEU’s ruling in Teva (C-121/2017) and a proposal for its implementation. The abstract is reproduced below, the paper is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3270898
Comments and critique are welcome and may be sent to roberto.romandini@ip.mpg.de.

Abstract: On 25 July 2018 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered the eagerly awaited decision on Art. 3(a) Reg. 469/2009 following the referral by Justice Arnold in Teva (C-121/2017). In answering the question what it means to be protected by the basic patent under Art. 3(a) Reg. 469/2009, the CJEU formulated a two-pronged requirement. In order to be eligible for a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) the product (i) must necessarily fall under the invention covered by the basic patent and (ii) be specifically identifiable in that patent. This further formula in the case law following Medeva (C-322/10) is open to a number of interpretations, the most restrictive of which is that the CJEU has adopted a core-inventive-advance test with the first prong and required an individual disclosure of the product with the second prong. This article proposes a purposive implementation of the decision which takes into account the policy goals underlying the CJEU case law. These goals are to prevent multiple SPCs for the same product in conjunction with a number of other active ingredients (“evergreening”), unless such combinations represent a “totally separate innovation” (C-443/12), and to prevent the grant of a certificate for monotherapy products that were developed by a third unrelated entity after the priority date of the basic patent. In order to achieve the first goal, an inventive-advance test is necessary, but also sufficient. In order to ensure the second goal, requiring a disclosure of the product in an individualized form is in some cases sufficient, but not necessary where the patentee has, after the priority date of the basic patent, developed the product and obtained the MA submitted in support of the application for a certificate. In view of the persistent lack of clarity of the case law, the article concludes with some thoughts on the role of the CJEU, the task of the lawmakers and the implication of the Unified Patent Court Agreement (UPCA) for the operation of the SPC system.

France - ezetimibe and simvastatin combination SPC - Paris Court of Appeal refuses request for preliminary injuction

Gérard Dossmann and Marianne Gabriel (Cassalonga) have kindly provided the SPC Blog with a copy of the original French text of a recent decision of the Paris Court of Appeal refusing a request for a preliminary injunction based on the SPC of the combination of ezetimibe and simvastatin.  In addition, they have kindly sent us a summary of the case, below.

By decision dated June 26, 2018, and on the basis of Articles 3 (c) and 3 (d) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009, the Paris Court of Appeal upheld the interim order issued on April 5, 2018 by the Paris Court of First Instance (here), dismissing the requests for preliminary injunction against Biogaran based on SPC n° 05C0040 protecting a combination product of ezetimibe and simvastatin. 

The basic patent and the SPC
In this case, the basic patent EP 0 720 599 (hereinafter EP 599), filed on September 14, 1994, and now expired, concerned "hydroxy-substituted azetidinone compounds effective as hypocholesterolemic agents", and referred in particular to ezetimibe in claim 8 and to the combination of ezetimibe with simvastatin in claim 17. 

This EP 599 patent is the basic patent of a first SPC No. 03C0028 (hereinafter SPC 028) relating to ezetimibe (corresponding to a marketing authorization for the Ezetrol®) which expired on April 17, 2018 and of a second SPC no. 05C0040 (hereinafter SPC 040) relating to the "ezetimibe optionally in the form of its pharmaceutically acceptable salts in combination with simvastatin" expiring on April 2, 2019 (corresponding to a marketing authorization for Inegy®). 

These two SPCs had been issued before the decisions of the CJEU in Medeva & Co. 

The proceedings
In December 2017, Biogaran filed an action on the merits before the Paris Court of First Instance for the invalidation of SPC 0040. 

Biogaran was subsequently summoned in interlocutory proceedings on February 15, 2018 by the owner of the SPC 040, accusing it of an imminent infringement of its rights and seeking interim measures against it. 

The interim order of 5 April 2018
By an interim order issued on April 5, 2018, the Paris Court of First Instance dismissed the holder of its application for preliminary injunction, considering : 

- if "claim 17 meets the condition laid down by the CJEU since it specifically targets simvastatin in combination with ezetimibe (...) however, to obtain a second SPC from the same basic patent, the combination must not only be specified as such in a claim, it must still be in itself the center of the invention", 

- and that in this case, "only the compounds of the substituted azetidinone family among which ezetimibe are the heart of the invention, simvastatin being already known", and "if this association corresponds to the novelty criterion as far as the validity of SPC 05C0040 is concerned, it does not correspond to the additional criterion defined by the CJEU which imposes that the claim relating to the combination discloses the center of the invention. However, this association is only the juxtaposition of two characteristics or active ingredients, one that can exist without the other and does not require the implementation of the other to come true, what companies also admit [the claimants]. The patent does not teach any advantage in taking ezetimibe and simvastatin in the same tablet compared to taking a drug containing ezetimibe alone and another medicine containing simvastatin alone”, "thus, this proposed combination does not correspond to the center of the invention","therefore, failing to fulfill the second condition defined in Georgetown namely that the claimed combination is also the center of the invention, SPC 05C0040 is not valid and will be declared invalid". 

Confirmation by the Court of Appeal: the decision of June 26, 2018
Ruling in summary proceedings, the Paris Court of Appeal has just confirmed the order in all its provisions, ruling not only in the light of Article 3 (c) but also of Article 3 (d) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009. 

After referring to the Case Law of the Court of Justice, the Paris Court of Appeal ruled: 

Implementation of Article 3 (c) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009:
"It is not disputed in the present case that simvastatin, an active ingredient in the category of statins or "HMG CoA reductase inhibitors", is not protected as such by this patent or, elsewhere, by another patent;

It follows that Article 3 (c) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 6, 2009, as interpreted by that judgment, precluded that SPC 040 be granted;

Whereas, however, in order to oppose the foregoing, the companies[respondent] claim, as stated above, that EP 599 would cover two inventions, one relating to a new class of compounds, of which ezetimibe and the other on the use of ezetimibe in combination with statins for the reduction of cholesterol level in the blood and within the meaning of Articles 1 and 3 (a) of the SPC Regulation, the combination of active ingredients ezetimibe and simvastatin would constitute a "product" protected by the basic patent;

But whereas it follows from the foregoing reasons that only ezetimibe is the novel active ingredient protected by EP 599, while simvastatin, a known medicinal product, is not protected by that patent, the claim regarding the inventive nature of their combination is inoperative in the light of the foregoing reasons in the aforementioned judgment C-443-12; (...)” 

Implementation of Article 3 (d) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009:
“Considering finally, even assuming, what is denied above, that EP 599 protects, within the meaning of Articles 1 and 3 (a) of the SPC Regulation, as such two distinct products, on the one hand ezetimibe, on the other hand, the combination of ezetimibe with simvastatin, it is rightly that in case of appeal the company Biogaran opposes that the marketing authorization of July 28, 2005 covering this second combination product under the trademark Ezetrol® would not have been the first within the meaning of Article 3 (d) of the Regulation; 

It is apparent from the summary of the characteristics of the product Ezetrol® that gave rise to the marketing authorization of June 11, 2003 that this medicinal product, proposed in the form of a 10 mg tablet of ezetimibe, is the subject of a therapeutic indication in association with a statin for the treatment of hypercholesterolemia, for the prevention of cardiovascular events and homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia; that its dosage, when prescribed with a statin, is the subject of particular developments; that its administration in association with a statin is contraindicated in certain cases, especially in case of pregnancy; more generally, the 17 pages of this document all refer to the administration of the drug Ezetrol® either alone or in combination with a statin; that more specifically, developments are devoted on pages 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 to the administration of Ezetrol with simvastatin; 

It follows from the foregoing analysis that the combination product of ezetimibe with simvastatin has already been the subject of a first marketing authorization on June 11, 2003, and that the second authorization obtained on July 28, 2005 did not allow the grant of a supplementary protection certificate under Article 3 (d) of the Regulation; 

Since the imminent infringement of a private right is not characterized, there is no need for summary proceedings and the order will be confirmed to that effect". 

The case is currently pending on the merits before the Paris Court of First Instance.

 Cassalonga acted for Biogaran.

Switzerland - Truvada and moving away from the "infringement test" for future SPCs for combination products

In a recent decision, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirmed the validity of Gilead’s Swiss TRUVADA® SPC and provided some guidance for combination products.  A copy of the decision is available here. 

Simon Holzer, Kilian Schärli and Marco Borer of Meyerlustenberger Lachenal AG, who acted for Gilead, have provided the summary and comments below along with an English translation of the decision (here).

"The Swiss Federal Supreme Court issued a landmark decision concerning the requirements for Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) for combination products. Until recently, Switzerland stood solid as a rock and defended the so-called infringement test for SPCs for combination products. The Federal Supreme Court has now ruled that while the infringement test shall still apply to existing SPCs, new SPCs for combination products shall be examined in light of the Medeva ruling and other decisions of the CJEU concerning combination products. Whether the Swiss SPC in dispute meets the requirements of the EU case law is not relevant and, therefore, has not been decided by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. 

The Swiss dispute in a nutshell
The Swiss litigation is about the validity of Gilead Sciences Inc.’s Swiss SPC C00915894/01 for the combination of tenofovir disoproxil fumarate plus emtricitabine. The SPC was granted by the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property on 29 August 2008 based on the marketing authorization for TRUVADA®, a medication used to treat (and in some jurisdictions also to prevent) HIV/AIDS. It is a fixed-dose combination of the two antiretroviral medications tenofovir disoproxil fumarate and emtricitabine. 

On 3 January 2017 Mepha Pharma AG, a Swiss subsidiary of Teva, filed a revocation action against Gilead’s Swiss SPC. Mepha essentially argued that the ratio legis of the Swiss law on SPCs requires that the “infringement test”, which had been confirmed in a decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in 1998 (BGE 124 III 375), be set aside, and that this change of practice shall be applicable with immediate effect even for existing SPCs. Mepha was of the opinion that Swiss courts should apply EU case law and if it did, Gilead’s SPC would be invalid in light of the practice of the CJEU for combination products because the two active ingredients were not specified in the claims of the basic patent and did not correspond to the basic patent’s core inventive advance. 

Gilead argued several lines of arguments. First, it was of the opinion that Switzerland should stick to the infringement test. Second, it argued that even if the EU practice for SPCs for combination products were to be introduced in Switzerland, this practice would only apply to new SPCs whose applications were filed after the change of practice. A change of practice could not have a retroactive effect according to Gilead. Third, Gilead took the position that even if the criteria established by the CJEU would apply to existing Swiss SPCs, those requirements – if correctly interpreted and applied – would be fulfilled by the SPC for TRUVADA®. 

In October 2017 the Swiss Federal Patent Court ruled that it was not appropriate to move away from the infringement test that had been applied in Switzerland since the Supreme Court’s decision BGE 124 III 375 (Fosinopril) in 1998. The Federal Patent Court examined several decisions of the CJEU dealing with SPCs for combination products (i.e. C-322/10 – Medeva, C-518/10 – Yeda, C-630/10 – University of Queensland, C-6/11 – Daiichi Sankyo, C-493/12 – Eli Lilly, and C-443/12 – Actavis/Sanofi) and came to the conclusion that the requirements of Article 3(a) of the EU SPC-Regulation No 469/2009, i.e. whether the product of an SPC is protected by the basic patent, are unclear and, therefore, there was no reason to move away from the infringement test. 

According to previous Swiss case law, it was not necessary that the product of the SPC be named and described in the basic patent. Rather, it was sufficient if the product was covered by the scope of the basic patent. The Federal Patent Court therefore dismissed the revocation action brought by Mepha against Gilead’s Swiss SPC. 

The decision of the Federal Supreme Court
Mepha filed an appeal against the verdict of the Federal Patent Court with the Swiss Federal Supreme Court. On 11 June 2018 the Federal Supreme Court dismissed Mepha’s appeal, but the dismissal is based on other grounds. 

The Federal Supreme Court concluded that SPCs for combination products granted under the infringement test (as confirmed by the Federal Supreme Court in 1998) were still to be assessed in light of the requirements of the infringement test. In an obiter dictum, however, the Federal Supreme Court ruled that new SPCs for combination products must comply with the requirements of the Medeva et al. case law of the CJEU in the future. 

Whether Gilead’s SPC for TRUVADA® meets these requirements was left open by the Federal Supreme Court, as this question is irrelevant since this SPC will continue to be judged according to the infringement test. 

Change of practice
The Federal Supreme Court held that a diverging practice between the CJEU and the Swiss courts in the field of SPCs could be a serious reason for a change in practice of the Swiss law. The Federal Supreme Court was of the opinion that Swiss lawmakers wanted to harmonize the Swiss law on SPCs with the laws in the EU. In this context, the Federal Supreme Court emphasized that the interpretation of the requirement “protected by a patent” according to Article 140b para. 1 lit. a of the Swiss Patent Act in the Fosinopril decision in 1998 (BGE 124 III 375) differed from the interpretation of “protected by a basic patent in force” according to Article 3(a) of the EU SPC-Regulation No 469/2009 by the CJEU according to the previous Swiss case law. 

Due to the fact that the Swiss legislature wanted to bring the protection of SPCs into harmony with that of the neighboring jurisdictions the Federal Supreme Court advocates an adaptation to the concept of the CJEU case law as expressed in the decisions of Medeva et al. However, the CJEU case law shall only apply to new SPCs according to the Federal Supreme Court. 

Existing SPCs are still subject to the infringement test
The Federal Supreme Court examined whether a change of practice could and should have an effect on SPCs that had already been granted, and, thus, whether Gilead’s SPC is valid even in the (not conclusively assessed and therefore hypothetical) case that the requirements for granting an SPC in light of the case law of the CJEU might not be fulfilled. 

The Federal Supreme Court emphasized that Gilead’s SPC had been legally granted in light of the infringement test in force at the time of the application and grant of Gilead’s SPC. The nullity grounds of the Swiss Patent Act refer to the question of whether the conditions for granting the SPC were fulfilled at the time of filing the SPC application. In the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court, this was clearly the case, since the infringement test was undisputedly the relevant test at the time Gilead’s SPC application was submitted to the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property. 

The Federal Supreme Court then examined whether, as an exception, a validly granted SPC can be revoked only because of a later change of practice, or more generally speaking, whether a legally binding administrative decision like the grant of an SPC could be reconsidered or revised as a result of a legal change of practice. As a general rule, the grant of an SPC cannot be revoked due to a later change of practice if the interest of the holder of the SPC in protecting his exclusive rights precedes the interest in the uniform implementation of the new law. Although this rule does not apply in absolute terms, the Federal Supreme Court could not see any particularly significant interest that would clearly demand a revocation of Gilead’s lawfully granted SPC simply because a change of practice has taken place many years after the grant. In the opinion of the Federal Supreme Court, Gilead’s interest in protecting its exclusive rights is clearly higher than the interest that in Switzerland all SPCs for combination products must be subject to exactly the same rules in the future. 

Comments
The recent ruling of the Federal Supreme Court strikes an interesting balance between the confidence of the owners of existing SPCs in the current practice and the industry’s interest in creating an EU-compatible system for Swiss SPCs. The judgment tries to protect the interests of patent owners and marketing authorization holders of originator pharmaceutical products who have made time-consuming and costly efforts in the authorization and marketing of their products on the one hand and the interest of the industry in bringing Swiss case law in line with the European Union practice. 

One question seems to remain open even after the decision of the Federal Supreme Court: According to the language of the decision of the Federal Supreme Court, the infringement test seems to apply to already granted SPCs. However, what happens with pending applications for SPCs for combination products? Those applications have been filed in light of the previous practice (i.e. by relying on the infringement test) as well. The Swiss Federal Patent Act explicitly provides that an SPC shall be granted if the requirements for the grant of the SPC are met at the filing date of the application. The applications for SPCs for combination products that are still pending before the Swiss Institute of Intellectual Property were filed in light of the then valid infringement test. It remains to be seen whether the fact that those applications have not yet resulted in a formal grant will make a major difference in whether they are examined in light of the infringement test or the EU case law. 

For example, on 11 January 2007 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights decided that a trademark application had to be protected as private property in the sense of Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, Case No. 73049). Although Switzerland has not ratified this protocol the considerations of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights nevertheless seem to be relevant when examining the legal nature of an SPC application."

Many thanks!

Formulations and Article 3(a) - a decision from the German Federal Patent Court

The German Federal Patent Court (Bundespatentgericht) recently issued a decision in ex parte appeal proceedings relating to the interpretation of Art. 3(a) of the SPC Regulation in regard to a patent protecting a formulation of known actives (Decision 14 W (pat) 10/16 of 23 January 2018, English translation here).  Many thanks to Bianca-Lucia Vos and Klemens Stratmann of Hoffmann Eitle for pointing this case out to us and for providing a thorough commentary, below:

The decision addresses an important aspect for determining whether a given product is “protected” by a basic patent in the sense of Art. 3(a) of Regulation (EC) no. 469/2009, which to date has not been addressed by any higher court in the EU. 

In the case underlying the decision, the GPTO had rejected SPC application 12 2010 000 015.7 submitted by GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals S.A. (“GSK”) for a combination of six antigens with reference to Art. 3(a). The Patent Division of the GPTO asserted in the appealed decision that, in view of the CJEU decisions Actavis/Sanofi (C-443/12), Georgetown II (C-484/12) as well as Actavis/Boehringer (C-577/13), a product is only then protected pursuant to Art. 3 (a) of the Regulation if the respective active ingredient or the active ingredient composition is protected by the basic patent “as such”.  

According to the GPTO, for protection “as such” to be affirmed within these terms, the product in question has to constitute the “core inventive advance” of the basic patent. To support this view, the Patent Division relied for instance on par. 29 of C-443/12, where the CJEU stated that it is possible, on the basis of a patent which protects several different ‘products’, to obtain several SPCs in relation to each of those different products, provided, inter alia, that each of those products is ‘protected’ as such by that ‘basic patent’ within the meaning of Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2009, in conjunction with Article 1(b) and (c) of that regulation.  

Since GSK’s basic patent (EP 0 835 663) related to formulations of previously known antigens with special adjuvants to provide hexavalent combination vaccines, the Patent Division opined that the inventive advance of the basic patent lay in the use of specific adjuvants and not in the provision of a new (and inventive) combination of antigens. From this, the Patent Division concluded that the product defined in the SPC application, i.e. “Diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, poliomyelitis, and Haemophilus influenzae type b conjugate, combination vaccine”, did not embody the inventive advance of the patent, respectively was not protected as such, and rejected the SPC application. 

The Federal Patent Court set aside this decision and granted the SPC for the requested product definition. In its decision, the Federal Patent Court first clarified that Actavis/Sanofi, Georgetown II as well as Actavis/Boehringer pertain primarily to the conditions for granting more than one SPC for the same product pursuant to Art. 3 (c) of Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 and do not contain any assessment criteria going beyond the principles established by the CJEU in Medeva (C-322/10) and Eli Lilly (C-493/12) regarding the application of Art. 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009. The Federal Patent Court highlighted that the circumstances of Actavis/Sanofi, Georgetown II and Actavis/Boehringer required an assessment as to whether the combination of active ingredients A+B has to be regarded as the “same innovation” as compared to the individual active ingredient A (for which the patent proprietor had already obtained an SPC), and therefore no further SPC should have been granted for the combination of active ingredients A + B under Art. 3(c) of the Regulation.  

Only for the purpose of examining under Art. 3(c), whether the combination of A + B embodies the inventive advance of the patent, it is therefore of relevance whether the individual actives (A and/or B) are protected as such by the basic patent.  

The Federal Patent Court acknowledges with this decision that formulation patents are eligible for an SPC extension to the same extent as other patent types such as use or process patents. This decision is of fundamental importance since the approach taken by the GPTO in the contested decision would have rendered it impossible to extend the vast majority of formulation patents. The reason being that, as a rule, formulation patents do not protect the product, i.e. the active ingredient or the combination of active ingredients in the sense of Article 1(b) of the Regulation, “as such”. It is rather the formulation of known actives by means of specific auxiliary substances, such as adjuvants (as in the case of vaccines) or excipients, that renders the claimed subject matter patentable and embodies the inventive advance of the patent.  

The decision of the Federal Patent Court appears to put into question as to whether the interpretation of Art. 3(a) of the Regulation proposed by J. Arnold would also be applicable in the event that the basic patent is not a product patent but rather a formulation, process or use patent. J. Arnold repeatedly suggested to the CJEU in proceedings before the UK High Court of Justice that Article 3(a) should be interpreted as meaning that the product is "protected" by the basic patent if (i) the product falls within the scope of the claim when interpreted in accordance with the Extent of Protection Rules and (ii) the product does so because it contains an active ingredient, or a combination of active ingredients, which embodies the inventive advance (or technical contribution) of the patent (cf. par. 97 of Teva UK Ltd & Ors v Gilead Sciences Inc [2017] EWHC 13 (Pat) (13 January 2017) and par. 11 of Sandoz Ltd & Anor v G.D. Searle LLC & Anor [2017] EWHC 987 (Pat) (3 May 2017). It would appear that this test is not suitable for determining if a given formulation, use or process patent protects the product in the sense of Article 3(a). By contrast, the test developed by J. Warren seems to have a broader applicability and would, in our view, also lead to the correct result in the case of formulation, use or process patents (cf. par. 65 to 71 of Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences [2014] EWHC 2404 (Pat) (18 July 2014)). J. Warren suggested that a given product will be protected within Article 3(a), if it falls within the claims, subject to one proviso relating to circumstances where the claims contain some general word or words extending their extent beyond the principal scope of the claims, typically by the use of a word such as "comprises". 

Meanwhile, three referral proceedings are pending before the CJEU all of which concern the interpretation of Article 3(a) of the Regulation and the criteria for determining whether a given product is protected by the basic patent or not (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court of Justice (Chancery Division) (United Kingdom) made on 8 March 2017 – Teva UK Ltd, Accord Healthcare Ltd, Lupin Ltd, Lupin (Europe) Ltd, Generics (UK) trading as "Mylan" v Gilead Sciences Inc. (Case C-121/17); Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundespatentgericht (Germany) lodged on 21 November 2017 (Case C-650/17); and Sandoz et al. v. G.D. Searle et. al [2018] EWCA Civ 49, UK Court of Appeal, Judgment of 25 January 2018). It would be desirable if the CJEU does not limit the forthcoming judgements to the concrete facts of the respective referral decision but rather develops a generally applicable test which allows to ascertain whether a given product is protected in the sense of Article 3(a) in all possible circumstances including those addressed by the Federal Patent Court in the recently issued decision.

A new CJEU referral on claims with functional features

Last week, the 14th Senate of the German Federal Patent Court referred new questions to the CJEU on the criteria for Article 3(a) of Regulation (EC) No. 469/2009 (decision 14 W (pat) 12/17) in an attempt to clarify when a functional definition in a claim refers implicitly, but necessarily and specifically to the product in question, as stipulated by the CJEU in Eli Lilly (C-493/12).

Dirk Bühler (Maiwald), who acted for the patentee Royalty Pharma, has kindly provided a copy of the decision (here), an English translation of the decision (here) and a summary of the case (see below the questions).  For those who just want to read the questions, they are reproduced directly below:

1. Is a product protected by a basic patent in force according to Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 only if it belongs to the protected subject-matter as defined by the claims and is thus provided to the person skilled in the art as a specific embodiment? 

2. Is it therefore not sufficient for the requirements of Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 that the product in question meets the general functional definition of an active substance class as mentioned in the claims, but apart from that is not individualized as a specific embodiment of the teaching protected by the basic patent?

3. Is a product not protected according by Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 by a basic patent in force if it is covered by the functional definition contained in the claims, but was developed only after the filing date of the basic patent based on independent inventive activity?

Summary 

Background 

It seems fair to say that Medeva (C-322/10) and its progenies have rather complicated than clarified as to when a product is protected by a basic patent in accordance with Article 3 (a) of the Regulation (see e.g. latest referral of Judge Arnold ([2017] EWHC 13 (pat)).

Even though it is clear in view of the numerous decisions by the CJEU since Medeva that Article 3(a) precludes SPCs for products which would infringe the patent despite not being referred to in the claims at all, e.g. for the presence of the term “comprising, there has been a debate as to how specifically the product must be disclosed in individualized form in the claims. 

For claims with functional definitions this debate has focused on whether the requirement set by Eli Lilly that such claims must refer implicitly, but necessarily and specifically to the product allows for SPCs in situations where the product is not disclosed as an individualized embodiment. Whilst this position has been endorsed by the UK courts for generic antibody claims ([2014] EWHC 2404 (Pat)) and claims with Markush formulas ([2017] EWHC 987 (Pat)), patent offices in other jurisdictions have taken a more restrictive standpoint and interpret Eli Lilly to require an individualized disclosure of the specific compound at least in the specification or to refer to antibodies only.

The referred case
The claims of the basic patent EP 1 084 705 B1 are concerned with the treatment of Diabetes mellitus by administration of DPIV-inhibitors and are based on the inventors’ recognition that inhibition of the enzyme DPIV generally allows for lowering of blood glucose levels by preserving the endogenous incretin hormones. The patent discloses individual DPIV inhibitors and points out that other DPIV inhibitors may be used as well. The general nature of the invention has been recognized by the German Federal Court of Justice in its decision on the German patent DE 196 16 486  based on the priority filing which belongs to the leading case on enablement in Germany (BGH X ZB 8/12 – Dipeptidyl-Peptidase-Inhibitoren).

DPIV-inhibitors marketed for treatment of Diabetes mellitus include sitagliptin which is not disclosed individually in the basic patent and has been developed by a licensee of the patent. Sitagliptin is also protected by a later filed composition of matter patent. The situation is thus comparable with Eli Lilly where the claims were directed to the genus of Neutrokine-alpha antibodies, but the product in question, tabalumab which is a Neutrokine-alpha antibody, was not individually disclosed in the claims or the specification and had been developed after the filing date of the basic patents.
An SPC application for sitagliptin was rejected by the German Patent and Trademark Office because sitagliptin would not be disclosed individually in the patent. The rejection was appealed.

In its referring decision the Senate acknowledges that sitagliptin is a DPIV-inhibitor as demonstrated by the assessment report of the EMA and would thus be within the extent of protection conferred by Article 69 EPC. However, according to the Senate’s interpretation of Medeva and Eli Lilly it would not be sufficient for the purpose of Article 3 (a) that the product in question, namely sitagliptin, falls within the extent of protection (Schutzbereich )conferred by the claims. It would rather be required that the product is disclosed specifically enough to form the subject matter (Schutzgegenstand) of the claims which in the absence of an individualized disclosure of sitagliptin in the basic patent would not be the case. 

The Senate however acknowledges that a different position has been taken by e.g. UK courts on highly comparable case scenarios (see [2017] EWHC 987 (Pat) in view of Medeva and Eli Lilly. This divergent interpretation of the CJEU’s case law by the national courts and patent offices would not be acceptable to applicants and run counter to the overall objective of the Regulation, namely to provide a uniform solution for the common market. 

The Senate has therefore decided to stay the appeal proceedings and to refer the following questions:

1. Is a product protected by a basic patent in force according to Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 only if it belongs to the protected subject-matter as defined by the claims and is thus provided to the person skilled in the art as a specific embodiment?

2. Is it therefore not sufficient for the requirements of Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 that the product in question meets the general functional definition of an active substance class as mentioned in the claims, but apart from that is not individualized as a specific embodiment of the teaching protected by the basic patent?

3. Is a product not protected according by Article 3 (a) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 by a basic patent in force if it is covered by the functional definition contained in the claims, but was developed only after the filing date of the basic patent based on independent inventive activity?

Thanks Dirk!

Tenofovir - the Swiss Bundespatentgericht goes for the infringement test

The SPC Blog is grateful to Siegfried Grimm at E. Blum & Co. for providing the following summary of a recent Tenofovir case in Switzerland:

The year is 2017 B.C. Europe is entirely governed by European Legislation. Well, not entirely... One small country of indomitable Swiss still holds out against the invaders. And life is not easy for the European judges who reside the fortified camps of Luxembourg ... 

In its decision of October 3, 2017 (here in German), the Swiss Federal Patent Court clarified what the criteria are for deciding “whether the product is protected by a basic patent in force”.  The Swiss court clearly refused to adopt the CJEU's “Medeva” line of decisions. As a consequence, Swiss SPCs will be assessed based on the infringement test.  No additional criteria, such as “specified in the wording of the claims” (Medeva), “the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily …” (Eli Lilly), “core inventive advance …” (Actavis) or the like are to be applied.  Accordingly, the Swiss court applied a more liberal approach compared to the CJEU, leaving room for Swiss SPCs where European SPCs are likely not available.  

The SPC in question relates to tenovofir disoproxil fumarate + emtricitabine.  Claim 1 of the basic patent covers tenovofir disoproxil fumarate and claim 27 mentions “optionally other active ingredients”, without mentioning of emtricitabine.  The Swiss court came to the conclusion that this SPC is protected by a basic patent in force and thus perfectly complies with Swiss practice.  The court also came to the conclusion, that the above CJEU decisions will not help deciding the case, as Eli Lilly might be in favor of such decision while Actavis would rule against it.  

The decision is open to appeal within 30 days. 

Interestingly, the same case is litigated before the High Court, [2017] EWHC 13 (Pat), now pending before the CJEU.

Darunavir and the interpretation of Article 3(a) by Mr Justice Arnold

darunavir

Earlier this week, Mr Justice Arnold handed down a decision (here, [2017] EWHC 987 (Pat)) relating to the validity of Searle’s SPC to darunavir  in view of Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation.

The facts of the case are as follows: G.D. Searle LLC hold SPC/GB07/038 (“the SPC”) to darunavir.  Janssen Sciences Ireland UC is the exclusive licensee. The SPC is based on EP 0 810 209, to which claim 1 is directed to a compound presented by Formula I

wherein the substituents P1, P2, R2, R3, and R4 are listed.

Sandoz and Hexal challenged the validity of the SPC on the basis that it does not comply with Article 3(a) of the SPC Regulation because darunavir is not specified or identified in any of the claims of the patent.  In particular, they argued that although darunavir falls within the scope of the claims, it is not specifically identified by name or structure in the claims or in the specification, nor is there any teaching in the patent which points to darunavir.

After briefly reviewing the CJEU’s  “guidance” in the Medeva and Lilly cases in relation to whether a product satisfies the requirement of Article 3(a) of the SPC regulation, Mr Justice Arnold came to the conclusion that it is sufficient for the claim to specify the product by means of a Markush formula which covers it.  Not entirely happy with the CJEU’s unclear tests, he also referred to what he considered as a better test, and as he advanced in Teva v Gilead, which would require that the product falls within the claim and that it embodies the inventive advance (or technical contribution) of the claim.

Kristina Cornish and Dayle Callaghan of Kilburn & Strode LLP were part of the team acting for the defendant in this successful matter.

SPCs on the agenda, and a chance to save some money

If you are attending this year's C5 Life Sciences IP Summit (programme here) in Berlin on 22 to 23 October 2015, it has a session on SPCs that looks like this:

4:15 to 5:30 A Case-Law Review of the Jurisprudence on Supplementary Protection Certificates in Europe

• Matthew Royle
  Partner
  Taylor Wessing (United Kingdom)

• Lessons learnt from C-493/12 (Lilly-HGS), C-631/13 (Forsgren), E-16/14 (Pharmaq-Intervet)
• An overview of the pending referrals concerning SPCs before the CJEU
• Understanding under which circumstances you can obtain an SPC in the context of antibody claims
• Obtaining an SPC on combinations of active ingredients for new uses
• Neurim’s, Medeva’s, Georgetown’s, AstraZeneca’s, Merck’s aftermath: an overview of the CJEU’s interpretation on development of a new indication from an old substance

IPKat blog readers can get a 15% reduction on the registration fee: details can be found here.

“What’s the CJEU said this time?" Seminar report

Last Thursday The SPC Blog announced the AIPPI UK's Rapid Response seminar on recent SPC rulings from the Court of Justice of the European Union, which took place just three days ago, on Monday. Well, with remarkable alacrity a report on the seminar has been prepared, thanks to Natalia Wegner-Cribbs (Carpmaels) for putting it together. The report is repeated on AIPPI’s website along with the slides here.

AIPPI Event Report: “What’s the CJEU said this time? A review of the latest SPC musings from Luxembourg”

Monday night saw AIPPI’s latest event on recent SPC judgments from the CJEU, hosted by Carpmaels & Ransford LLP.  Justin Watts (AIPPI President, Freshfields) chaired the event, with insightful and topical presentations by Mike Lubienski (UCB) and Daniel Wise & Ed Oates (Carpmaels), focusing on Actavis v Boehringer (C-577/13) and Forsgren (C-631/13).  Over 70 SPC enthusiasts from across the industry attended the event, which concluded with a drinks reception providing the opportunity for a chat with the speakers and other attendees. 

Actavis v Boehringer (noted on The SPC Blog here and on the IPKat here) was discussed against the backdrop of the earlier cases in Medeva (C-322/10), Actavis v Sanofi (C-443-12) and Georgetown II (C-484/12).  In Actavis v Boehringer, an earlier SPC had been obtained for a ‘mono’ product (telmisartan), and the SPC applicant sought a second SPC based on the same patent but a later marketing authorisation to a combination product (telmisartan and hydrochlorothiazide).  According to the CJEU, the parties had agreed that telmisartan “is the sole subject-matter of the invention”, and it followed that the claim to the combination was not the subject-matter of the invention.  Based on this logic, the CJEU held that the combination SPC was invalid.  It was discussed at the event which test should be used for determining the “subject-matter of the invention”.  Must each substance in the combination product (e.g. hydrochlorothiazide), when taken in isolation, constitute the “subject-matter of the invention”, or can the combination itself be the “subject-matter of the invention” if it is inventive in its own right?  Unfortunately for patent practitioners, the CJEU never considered the second question, which asked whether it is allowable to base an SPC on a basic patent that has been amended after grant.  This question is relevant in view of European oppositionamendment practice, as well as recent CJEU case law suggesting that active ingredients must be adequately specified in the claims.  We should therefore expect questions on this point being referred to the CJEU in the future.

Forsgren (noted on The SPC Blog here and on the IPKat here) dealt with combinations of a different kind, namely where substances are present in a medicinal product not side by side but covalently linked to each other.  According to the CJEU, an active ingredient (here,protein D) can indeed be the subject of a SPC even where it is covalently linked to another substance (here, pneumococcal saccharides), but the active ingredient must produce an effect “of its own”, and that effect must be “covered” by the therapeutic indications of the marketing authorisation.  The potential practical implications of this judgment were discussed, as well as the many questions that it opens up.  What happens if the marketing authorisation is varied to include new indications?  And how does the decision align with the Plant Protection Regulation and the definition of an “active substance” in the recent Bayer CropScience case (C-11/13, noted on The SPC Blog here)? 

In summary, this was a stimulating meeting of practical relevance for those interested in SPCs.  Being the third of its kind, these rapid response SPC meetings are always well attended and have become a bit of speciality for the AIPPI UK group.

Gardasil: Israel draws closer to EU practice on combination products

Liad Whatstein (now practising as Liad Whatstein & Co) has just sent The SPC Blog the following report on an decision recently handed down by the Israeli Patent Office in connection with a patent term extension (PTE) for combination products. In essence the Israeli Patents Commissioner held that a patent claiming a single active ingredient was eligible for a PTE in connection with a combination product that comprised additional active ingredients. This decision, adds Liad, brings Israeli law in closer conformity with EU law in connection with SPCs for combination products. Writes Liad:

Gardasil is a quadrivalent vaccine comprising the proteins HPV18 L1, HPV16 L1, HPV11 L1 and HPV6 L1. Each of the four proteins in the vaccine protects against a separate strain of the Human Papilloma Virus (HPV). Merck's Israeli patent covers the HPV18 L1 protein and a composition comprising the protein. It does not specifically claim the other proteins included in Gardasil.

Under sections 64D(1) and 64A of the Israeli Patents Act, in order to be eligible for extension, the patent must claim the "material" ("the active ingredient in the medicinal product"). The Israeli PTO initially rejected Merck's PTE petition on the ground that the Israeli patent did not claim all the active ingredients in the product (i.e. there was no "match" between the scope of the patent and the "material").

The office's approach was in line with the approach taken in the past by several Patent Offices in Europe but was rejected by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Medeva and subsequently in Queensland & CSL which also related to Gardasil. It was also opposed to the traditional approach taken by the USPTO.

Merck appealed to Patents Commissioner. On 11 January 2015 the Commissioner overruled the decision and granted the PTE petition. In reaching his decision, the Commissioner noted that each protein in Gardasil was produced in separate fermentation and was a standalone API. Accordingly, the fact that HPV 18 L1 was combined with three other active ingredients in the product did not undermine the eligibility for patent term extension for the patent claiming a single protein.

Significantly, the Commissioner essentially adopted the patentee's approach solely based on analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and related Israeli case law, and completely disregarded the CJEU Medeva ruling. Nevertheless, the Commissioner's decision is an important precedent that brings Israeli law in closer conformity with EU law in connection with SPCs for combination products.

Generally, the Israeli Office is attentive to the legal situation and judicial developments in major jurisdictions. One exception is with respect to the peculiar and rather restrictive PTE system under Israeli law (for a short overview of these peculiarities see earlier SPC Blog post here). The Office has traditionally taken a restrictive approach in interpreting the PTE provisions, often resulting in denial of PTE eligibility. It is yet to be seen whether the recent decision may be a first step in the direction of more balanced decisions on patent term extensions.

Liad represented the patentee in the proceedings.

A Bulgarian milestone as Supreme Court rules on Atripla application

From our friend Dimitar Batakliev (IP Attorney, Bulgaria) comes the following news:

"I would like to report a recent case before the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria regarding an SPC application for Atripla, a drug for treatment of HIV infection.

In a decision of 8 June 2014 the Court held that the claimed product, consisting of efavirenz, emtricitabine and tenofovir disoproxil fumarate, was not protected by the basic patent BG 62612 and therefore did not meet the requirements of Article 3 of the SPC Regulation. According to the court, this combination was outside the scope of claim 8 which protected 

“a combination of a compound of Formula I or Formula II according to claim 2 with a nucleoside analog having biological activity against HIV reverse transcriptase”. 

Although efavirenz was found to be a compound of Formula I and emtizitabine -- a nucleoside analogue -- the court held that the claim envisaged only combinations of two active ingredients, while the applied product consisted of three. Further, the court confirmed that the third ingredient, tenofovir disoproxil fumarate, was also outside the scope of the claim as it was a nucleotide rather than a nucleoside analogue. Although after its intake it was transformed in the human body into a nucleoside, at the time of composing the claimed product it lacked such characteristics. As a result the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of first instance and instead upheld the decision of the Patent Office to reject the application of Merck Sharp & Dohme Inc.

In its detailed analysis the Supreme Court touched on a number of important topics of the SPC domain. It provided guidance on the methods of interpretation of patent claims, on the applicability of the infringement test and the significance of the Medeva and Eli Lilly decisions. It also commented on decisions of other jurisdictions which had been put forward by the parties in support of their arguments. Therefore, in my opinion the Atripla case resulted in a milestone decision of the Bulgarian case law with respect to the application of the SPC Regulation.

If you can cope with the original Bulgarian text of the judgment, Dimitar has kindly provided a link to it here.

SPCs based on functional claims, tabalumab and Neutrokine-α

The decision of Mr Justice Warren in Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences Ltd [2014] 2404 EWHC (Pat) in the Patents Court, England and Wales, was handed down on Friday. While it's still not available on BAILII, this judgment is currently being kindly hosted by our friends at Powell Gilbert LLP who represented HGS (now part of GSK) in these proceedings. Powell Gilbert have also furnished us with the following note on this ruling which, with minor edits, we reproduce in full:

Lilly v HGS – Article 3(a) SPC Regulation – Guidance on obtaining SPCs based on functional claims

Summary

Article 3(a) of Regulation 469/2009 requires that a product which is the subject of an application for an SPC must be “protected by a basic patent in force”. This was held by the Court of Justice of the European Union (the “CJEU”) in Medeva (Case C-322/10 [noted on this weblog here]) to mean that the active ingredient must be “specified” in the wording of the claims.

In October 2012 the Patents Court for England and Wales (Warren J) in Eli Lilly and Company Ltd v Human Genome Sciences, Inc. referred further questions to the CJEU regarding the interpretation of Article 3(a). In December 2013 the CJEU handed down its judgment in the Lilly case (C-493/12), holding that it is not necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural formula. Article 3(a) does not, in principle, preclude the grant of an SPC where the active ingredient is covered by a functional claim provided that “the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically” to the active ingredient in question.

The case returned to the Patents Court (Warren J) in May and June 2014. The judgment provides important guidance as to the interpretation of the CJEU’s decision and the circumstances in which SPCs may be obtained for products based on claims defined in functional terms.

Background

Human Genome Sciences, Inc. (“HGS” – now owned by GlaxoSmithKline) is the proprietor of European Patent (UK) No 0 939 804 which relates to and claims a novel protein called Neutrokine-α and antibodies which bind specifically to it. The patent has been held to be valid by the UK Courts (including the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court) and the Technical Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office. Of particular importance is the wording of claim 13 which claims:

“An isolated antibody or portion thereof that binds specifically to (a) the full length Neutrokine-α polypeptide … or (b) the extracellular domain of the Neutrokine-α polypeptide …”.

Eli Lilly and Company Ltd (“Lilly”) wishes to market, in due course, a product containing an antibody (known as tabalumab) that binds specifically to Neutrokine-α. Lilly has not yet received a marketing authorisation (“MA”) for tabalumab.

Lilly issued a claim against HGS seeking a declaration from the Patents Court that any SPC granted to HGS in respect of the patent and based upon any MA for tabalumab would be invalid.

Lilly’s case was that tabalumab is not “protected by” the patent for the purposes of Article 3(a) as tabalumab is not specified in the wording of the claims. That, Lilly submitted, would require a structural definition of the active ingredient in the claims of the patent. 

Lilly had originally sought to argue a further ground on which any SPC would be invalid, namely that HGS would not be able to obtain an SPC based on the HGS Patent and an MA held by a third party (Lilly) – the “Third Party Issue”. Lilly discontinued this aspect of the claim before the CJEU hearing in September 2013.

HGS’s case was that tabalumab fell within the scope of protection of claim 13 (as interpreted by section 125 of the UK Patents Act, Article 69 of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”) and the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69) and that that claim related “implicitly but necessarily and specifically” to tabalumab, as required by the CJEU.  

The judgment of Warren J

As with other decisions of the CJEU in relation to the SPC Regulation, regrettably the guidance given is not clear. This is reflected by the fact that both Lilly and HGS had applied to the Patents Court for judgment in their favour on the basis of the CJEU’s decision. The Court also observed that “one thing the [CJEU decision] does not give is the clear guidance which the reference was designed to obtain” (paragraph 4).

In dismissing Lilly’s claim for declaratory relief, the Court explains (paragraph 67) that the CJEU has clearly held that functional definitions can, in principle, be sufficient to bring an active ingredient within the protection of a basic patent. This is on the condition that the “claims relate implicitly but necessarily and specifically” to the active ingredient.

The Court held at paragraph 70 that the correct reading of the CJEU’s judgment required an application of the relevant rules (i.e. Article 69 EPC or Section 125 Patents Act 1977) to ascertain the extent of the invention and what the claims relate to. If the active ingredient in question is covered by the claims, it is protected for the purposes of Article 3(a) – subject to a proviso.

This proviso is explained at paragraph 66 of the Judgment and is necessary to reflect the approach of the CJEU in Medeva in relation to products containing combinations of active ingredients. A product is not protected within the meaning of Article 3(a) solely by virtue of a claim containing general wording that extends the claim beyond its principle scope (such as “comprises”). However, in the absence of such extending words, the Court held that “the claims have a focused scope and the question is simply whether the product falls within the scope of the claims” (paragraph 66). Lilly had conceded during the course of these proceedings that tabalumab falls within the scope of claim 13 of the patent, and the proviso did not apply since there were no extending words. Tabalumab was therefore “protected by” the patent within the meaning of Article 3(a).

Finally, the Court considered (at paragraphs 44-54 of the judgment) that paragraph 43 of the CJEU’s decision, which relates to whether a patent owner has made any investment in the research leading to the MA, is more relevant to the discontinued Third Party Issue than to the test under Article 3(a). However, the Court made clear that SPCs are intended to be available without discrimination for the type, or stage, of research leading to the grant of the basic patent. 

What next?

The judgment provides welcome guidance on the interpretation of Article 3(a) and confirms the availability of SPCs for products based on functional claim language (such as for antibodies defined by their binding target). On Friday Lilly was been granted leave to appeal, so the issues will be reviewed further in due course. 

Correction: Gilding the Lilly: a rapid response event

There's an interesting event coming up next Monday, 20 January [and NOT 13 January, which is of course today], in London. It's called "Rapid Response - Gilding the Lilly: Making Sense of the CJEU’s recent SPC decisions". According to Sara Ashby (Redd), who is the AIPPI UK's Hon Sec)

Registration is now open for this rapid response event which will review the CJEU’s recent decisions in Lilly, Actavis and Georgetown II, which have been eagerly awaited by the SPC community. Speakers from industry and private practice will discuss whether the CJEU has cleared up the confusion left by Medeva, and where the law might go next in this rapidly moving field. 

Carpmaels & Ransford has kindly agreed to host this event (One Southampton Row, London WC1B 5HA) and to provide drinks afterwards. 

Attendance is free for members and new applicants for membership, and £25 for non-members. CPD 1.5hrs.

If you would like to attend this event (open to members and non-members) please register at http://aippiukspcsagain2014.eventbrite.co.uk. At the time of registering if someone else (eg: your secretary or P.A.) registers on your behalf, please make sure that they book in your name, so that the name of the person who is attending - and wants the CPDs – is the name which makes it onto the attendee list.

Shakespeare scholars will be itching to tell everyone that the expression "gild the lily" isn't quite what the Bard actually said: in King John he wrote "to gild refined gold, to paint the lily". but that's beside the point!

Particular about particles: Spain gets to grips with multivalent vaccines

The SPC Blog is delighted to have received the following detailed information from José Ángel García-Zapata (Associate,  Bird & Bird (Spain) LLP) on some recent case law in which the Spanish courts had the opportunity to apply some of the burgeoning jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  Thanks so much, José Ángel, for making this huge effort on behalf of the SPC community!

Spanish Courts apply the recent case law by the CJEU on SPCs for multivalent vaccines (University of Queensland and CSL Limited v Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office)

Between February and December 2007, the University of Queensland and the company CSL Limited filed eight applications for Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) at the Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office (SPTO) for the particles contained in the multivalent vaccines Gardasil® and Cervarix®, two well-known medicines for the prevention of the cervical cancer. The applicants had also filed identical applications in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden.

Specifically, the applicants intended to obtain one SPC for each particle contained in Gardasil® (virus-like particles of the human papillomavirus types 6, 11, 16, and 18) and each particle contained in Cervarix® (virus-like particles of human papillomavirus types 16 and 18), as well as two additional SPCs for the combination of particles contained in each medicine, thus resulting in the following eight SPC applications: 

1.       Virus-like particles (VLPs) of human papillomavirus (HPV) type 6 in Gardasil.
2.       VLPs of HPV 11 in Gardasil.
3.       VLPs of HPV 16 in Gardasil.
4.       VLPs of HPV 18 in Gardasil.
5.       VLPs of HPV 16 in Cervarix.
6.       VLPs of HPV 18 in Cervarix.
7.       The combination of VLPs of HPV types 6, 11, 16 and 18 in Gardasil.
8.      The combination of VLPs of HPV types 16 and 18 in Cervarix.

In order to fulfill the requirements provided by art. 3 of the SPC Regulation 1768/92 (SPCR), which was in force on the date of filing, the applicants referred in the applications to basic patents in force and also a valid marketing authorizations for the products. Thus, the basic patents quoted (art. 3.a) were EP 595 935 (for SPCs 1, 2 and 7), EP 1 298 211 (for SPCs 3 and 5) and EP 1 359 156 (for SPCs 4, 6 and 8). The marketing authorizations included (art. 3.b) were Gardasil® [Human Papillomavirus (Types 6, 11, 16, and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant] and Cervarix® [Human Papillomavirus (Types 16 and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant].

In December 2009, the SPTO rejected the granting of all the SPC applications, arguing that the owner of various patents referred to the same product cannot obtain various SPCs over the same product, and also that the authorized product was not covered by a basic patent in force. In order to support this latter argument, the Office quoted a decision issued by the Supreme Court on 4 July 2007 (Asociación Española de Fabricantes de Sustancias y Especialidades Farmacéuticas Genéricas v SPTO/E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.) whereby the Supreme Court had refused to grant a SPC for a process to prepare products derived from proline. 

The applicants filed administrative appeals against these decisions, based on the following arguments: (a) there are different active principles or products in the vaccines Gardasil® and Cervarix® which are the specific VLPs of HPV individually considered, as each particle is conceived to address a specific serotype; (b) each basic patent included in the application covers a different VLP; (c) the reasons given by the SPTO to reject the applications are inspired by a strict interpretation of the SPCR that is contrary to its underlying principles and also contrary to the interpretation given by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) - e.g., in Case C-392/97 Farmitalia - which stated that where a product in the form referred to in the marketing authorisation is protected by a basic patent in force, the supplementary protection certificate is capable of covering the product, as a medicinal product, in any of the forms enjoying the protection of the basic patent; and (c) other national patent offices had already granted the SPCs. 

Despite the above arguments, the appeals were dismissed by the Board of Appeals on the same basis that had already served to reject the granting of the SPCs. 

Dissatisfied with these decisions, the patent owners filed 8 appeals before the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (the regional High Court of Justice for administrative matters), one for each application. 

In parallel, the applicants had faced the same trouble in the UK, where the UKPTO had dismissed the SPCs and also the appeals filed against the refusal decisions, so they brought the case to the High Court of Justice (CH/2010/APP0620), where Justice Arnold decided, on December 2010, to request the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of arts. 3.a and 3.b of the SPCR (case C-630/10). The questions referred were aligned with those referred in other cases (C-322/10 Medeva, C-422/10 Georgetown University, C-518/10 Yeda Research & Development, or C-6/11 Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd.). Among others, Mr Justice Arnold asked the CJEU to give response to these key questions: 1) For the purposes of art. 3.a, is a multi-disease vaccine comprising multiple antigens protected by a basic patent if one antigen of the vaccines is protected by the basic patent in force?; 2) Does art. 3.b permit the grant of a SPC for a single active ingredient where (i) a basic patent in force protects the single active ingredient within the meaning of art. 3.a of the SPCR, and (ii) a medicinal product containing the single active ingredient together with one or more other active ingredients is the subject of a valid marketing authorization? 

In Spain, the applicants asked the Court to stay the proceedings until these questions were answered by the CJEU, but this petition was dismissed on two occasions. As a result of this, the applicants were obliged to submit their arguments without knowing the outcome of Case C-630/10. The arguments referred to the strict and incorrect interpretation of the SPCR made by the SPTO, in contrast to the interpretation made by the CJEU in previous rulings, taking into special consideration the rationale of the Regulation (e.g. in the Recitals 3, 7 and 8), which had been quoted by the Court in previous cases (C-392/97 and C-482/07). The claim also challenged the citation by the SPTO of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 2007, stating that it was a different case: there the basic patent did not mention one of the two active principles which were included in the marketing authorization, whereas in case of the SPCs filed by the University of Queensland and CSL Limited, all the VLP of HPV types were expressly mentioned in both the basic patent and the marketing authorization of Gardasil® and Cervarix®. 

Interestingly, despite of the dismissal to stay, the Spanish Court waited for the CJEU’s decision of in Case C-630/10 on 25 November 2011 prior to issue the judgments on 6 pending appeals, which were rendered between July and September 2013.

In line with the response given by the CJEU to the preliminary ruling request, the Spanish Court stated that art. 3.a of the SPCR does not allow the granting of SPCs for active ingredients that are not identified in the wording of the claim of the basic patent, and that art. 3.b allows the granting of a SPC for an active ingredient specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent where the medicinal product of the marketing authorization included in the SPC application contains not only that active ingredient but also other active ingredients. 

Before the Tribunal Superior de Justicia rendered the judgments, and in view of the interpretation given by the CJEU to art. 3.a SPCR in C-630/10, the applicants had withdrawn the appeals involving the combination of VLPs of HPV in Gardasil and Cervarix (i.e., applications 7 and 8 listed above), as the wording of the basic patents quoted in the application, individually considered, did not specify all the VLPs for which the SPC had been applied for.

In contrast, the remaining six appeals concerning SPCs of single active ingredients were upheld by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia, following the reasoning given by the CJEU. The State Attorney, defending the SPTO, has filed appeals to the Supreme Court against three of these judgments (SPCs 2, 4 and 5 of the list), but he missed the deadline for the other 3, so these decisions became non-appealable. The SPTO accordingly granted the applications in December 2013.