Actavis CJEU reference: your chance to comment

Case C-577/13 Actavis Group & Actavis is now well on its way to the Court of Justice of the European Union following a reference of several questions by Mr Justice Birss of the Patents Court, England and Wales (briefly noted on this blog here).  The questions referred look like this:

1. (a) If a patent does not, upon grant, contain a claim that explicitly identifies two active ingredients in combination, but the patent could be amended so as to include such a claim could this patent, whether or not such an amendment is made, be relied upon as a "basic patent in force" for a product comprising those ingredients in combination pursuant to Article 3(a) of Regulation No 469/2006/EC ("the Regulation")?

(b) Can a patent that has been amended after the grant of the patent and either (i) before and / or (ii) after grant of the SPC be relied upon as the "basic patent in force" for the purposes of fulfilling the condition set out in Article 3(a) of the Regulation?

(c) Where an applicant applies for an SPC for a product comprised of active ingredients A and B in circumstances where,

(i) after the date of application for the SPC but before the grant of the SPC, the basic patent in force, being a European Patent (UK) (the "Patent") is amended so as to include a claim which explicitly identifies A and B;

and

(ii) the amendment is deemed, as a matter of national law, always to have had effect from the grant of the Patent; is the applicant for the SPC entitled to rely upon the Patent in its amended form for the purposes of fulfilling the Art 3(a) condition?

2. For the purposes of determining whether the conditions in Article 3 are made out at the date of the application for an SPC for a product comprised of the combination of active ingredients A and B where (i) the basic patent in force includes a claim to a product comprising the combination of active ingredients A and B and (ii) there is already an SPC for a product comprising active ingredient A ("Product X") is it necessary to consider whether the combination of active ingredients A and B is a distinct and separate invention from that of A alone?

3. Where the basic patent in force "protects" pursuant to Article 3(a):

(a) A product comprising active ingredient A ("Product X"); and

(b) A product comprising a combination of active ingredient A and active ingredient B ("Product Y")

and where

(c) An authorisation to place Product X on the market as a medicinal product has been granted;

(d) An SPC has been granted in respect of Product X; and

(e) A separate authorisation to place Product Y on the market as a medicinal product has subsequently been granted,

does the Regulation, in particular Articles 3(c), 3(d) and/or 13(1) of the Regulation preclude the proprietor of the patent being issued with an SPC in respect of Product Y? Alternatively, if an SPC can be granted in respect of Product Y, should its duration be assessed by reference to the grant of the authorisation for Product X or the authorisation for Product Y?

4. If the answer to question 1(a) is in the negative and the answer to question 1(b)(i) is positive and the answer to question 1(b)(ii) is negative, then in circumstances where:

(i) in accordance with Art 7(1) Regulation, an application for an SPC for a product is lodged within six months of the date on which a valid authorisation to place that product on the market as a medicinal product has been granted in accordance with Directive 2001/83/EC or Directive 200l/82/EC;

(ii) following the lodging of the application for the SPC, the competent industrial property office raises a potential objection to the grant of the SPC under Article 3(a) of the Regulation;

(iii) following and in order to meet the aforesaid potential objection by the competent industrial property office, an application to amend the basic patent in force relied upon by the SPC applicant is made and granted;

(iv) upon amendment of the basic patent in force, said amended patent complies with Article 3(a),

does the SPC Regulation prevent the competent industrial property office from applying national procedural provisions to enable (a) suspension of the application for the SPC in order to allow the SPC applicant to apply to amend the basic patent, and (b) recommencement of said application at a later date once the amendment has been granted, the said date of recommencement being

- after six months from the date on which a valid authorisation to place that product on the market as a medicinal product was granted but

- within six months of the date on which the application to amend the basic pate?

If you would like to comment on this case, and thus guide the UK government in its decisions as to whether and how to make representations to the CJEU, please email policy@ipo.gov.uk by the agreeably generous date of 10 January 2014.

Particular about particles: Spain gets to grips with multivalent vaccines

The SPC Blog is delighted to have received the following detailed information from José Ángel García-Zapata (Associate,  Bird & Bird (Spain) LLP) on some recent case law in which the Spanish courts had the opportunity to apply some of the burgeoning jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union.  Thanks so much, José Ángel, for making this huge effort on behalf of the SPC community!

Spanish Courts apply the recent case law by the CJEU on SPCs for multivalent vaccines (University of Queensland and CSL Limited v Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office)

Between February and December 2007, the University of Queensland and the company CSL Limited filed eight applications for Supplementary Protection Certificates (SPCs) at the Spanish Patent and Trade Mark Office (SPTO) for the particles contained in the multivalent vaccines Gardasil® and Cervarix®, two well-known medicines for the prevention of the cervical cancer. The applicants had also filed identical applications in other European countries such as the United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Sweden.

Specifically, the applicants intended to obtain one SPC for each particle contained in Gardasil® (virus-like particles of the human papillomavirus types 6, 11, 16, and 18) and each particle contained in Cervarix® (virus-like particles of human papillomavirus types 16 and 18), as well as two additional SPCs for the combination of particles contained in each medicine, thus resulting in the following eight SPC applications: 

1.       Virus-like particles (VLPs) of human papillomavirus (HPV) type 6 in Gardasil.
2.       VLPs of HPV 11 in Gardasil.
3.       VLPs of HPV 16 in Gardasil.
4.       VLPs of HPV 18 in Gardasil.
5.       VLPs of HPV 16 in Cervarix.
6.       VLPs of HPV 18 in Cervarix.
7.       The combination of VLPs of HPV types 6, 11, 16 and 18 in Gardasil.
8.      The combination of VLPs of HPV types 16 and 18 in Cervarix.

In order to fulfill the requirements provided by art. 3 of the SPC Regulation 1768/92 (SPCR), which was in force on the date of filing, the applicants referred in the applications to basic patents in force and also a valid marketing authorizations for the products. Thus, the basic patents quoted (art. 3.a) were EP 595 935 (for SPCs 1, 2 and 7), EP 1 298 211 (for SPCs 3 and 5) and EP 1 359 156 (for SPCs 4, 6 and 8). The marketing authorizations included (art. 3.b) were Gardasil® [Human Papillomavirus (Types 6, 11, 16, and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant] and Cervarix® [Human Papillomavirus (Types 16 and 18) Vaccine, Recombinant].

In December 2009, the SPTO rejected the granting of all the SPC applications, arguing that the owner of various patents referred to the same product cannot obtain various SPCs over the same product, and also that the authorized product was not covered by a basic patent in force. In order to support this latter argument, the Office quoted a decision issued by the Supreme Court on 4 July 2007 (Asociación Española de Fabricantes de Sustancias y Especialidades Farmacéuticas Genéricas v SPTO/E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.) whereby the Supreme Court had refused to grant a SPC for a process to prepare products derived from proline. 

The applicants filed administrative appeals against these decisions, based on the following arguments: (a) there are different active principles or products in the vaccines Gardasil® and Cervarix® which are the specific VLPs of HPV individually considered, as each particle is conceived to address a specific serotype; (b) each basic patent included in the application covers a different VLP; (c) the reasons given by the SPTO to reject the applications are inspired by a strict interpretation of the SPCR that is contrary to its underlying principles and also contrary to the interpretation given by the European Court of Justice (CJEU) - e.g., in Case C-392/97 Farmitalia - which stated that where a product in the form referred to in the marketing authorisation is protected by a basic patent in force, the supplementary protection certificate is capable of covering the product, as a medicinal product, in any of the forms enjoying the protection of the basic patent; and (c) other national patent offices had already granted the SPCs. 

Despite the above arguments, the appeals were dismissed by the Board of Appeals on the same basis that had already served to reject the granting of the SPCs. 

Dissatisfied with these decisions, the patent owners filed 8 appeals before the Tribunal Superior de Justicia de Madrid (the regional High Court of Justice for administrative matters), one for each application. 

In parallel, the applicants had faced the same trouble in the UK, where the UKPTO had dismissed the SPCs and also the appeals filed against the refusal decisions, so they brought the case to the High Court of Justice (CH/2010/APP0620), where Justice Arnold decided, on December 2010, to request the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of arts. 3.a and 3.b of the SPCR (case C-630/10). The questions referred were aligned with those referred in other cases (C-322/10 Medeva, C-422/10 Georgetown University, C-518/10 Yeda Research & Development, or C-6/11 Daiichi Sankyo Company Ltd.). Among others, Mr Justice Arnold asked the CJEU to give response to these key questions: 1) For the purposes of art. 3.a, is a multi-disease vaccine comprising multiple antigens protected by a basic patent if one antigen of the vaccines is protected by the basic patent in force?; 2) Does art. 3.b permit the grant of a SPC for a single active ingredient where (i) a basic patent in force protects the single active ingredient within the meaning of art. 3.a of the SPCR, and (ii) a medicinal product containing the single active ingredient together with one or more other active ingredients is the subject of a valid marketing authorization? 

In Spain, the applicants asked the Court to stay the proceedings until these questions were answered by the CJEU, but this petition was dismissed on two occasions. As a result of this, the applicants were obliged to submit their arguments without knowing the outcome of Case C-630/10. The arguments referred to the strict and incorrect interpretation of the SPCR made by the SPTO, in contrast to the interpretation made by the CJEU in previous rulings, taking into special consideration the rationale of the Regulation (e.g. in the Recitals 3, 7 and 8), which had been quoted by the Court in previous cases (C-392/97 and C-482/07). The claim also challenged the citation by the SPTO of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 2007, stating that it was a different case: there the basic patent did not mention one of the two active principles which were included in the marketing authorization, whereas in case of the SPCs filed by the University of Queensland and CSL Limited, all the VLP of HPV types were expressly mentioned in both the basic patent and the marketing authorization of Gardasil® and Cervarix®. 

Interestingly, despite of the dismissal to stay, the Spanish Court waited for the CJEU’s decision of in Case C-630/10 on 25 November 2011 prior to issue the judgments on 6 pending appeals, which were rendered between July and September 2013.

In line with the response given by the CJEU to the preliminary ruling request, the Spanish Court stated that art. 3.a of the SPCR does not allow the granting of SPCs for active ingredients that are not identified in the wording of the claim of the basic patent, and that art. 3.b allows the granting of a SPC for an active ingredient specified in the wording of the claims of the basic patent where the medicinal product of the marketing authorization included in the SPC application contains not only that active ingredient but also other active ingredients. 

Before the Tribunal Superior de Justicia rendered the judgments, and in view of the interpretation given by the CJEU to art. 3.a SPCR in C-630/10, the applicants had withdrawn the appeals involving the combination of VLPs of HPV in Gardasil and Cervarix (i.e., applications 7 and 8 listed above), as the wording of the basic patents quoted in the application, individually considered, did not specify all the VLPs for which the SPC had been applied for.

In contrast, the remaining six appeals concerning SPCs of single active ingredients were upheld by the Tribunal Superior de Justicia, following the reasoning given by the CJEU. The State Attorney, defending the SPTO, has filed appeals to the Supreme Court against three of these judgments (SPCs 2, 4 and 5 of the list), but he missed the deadline for the other 3, so these decisions became non-appealable. The SPTO accordingly granted the applications in December 2013.

Super Thursday for SPCs No.3: Georgetown University v OCN

Case C‑484/12, Georgetown University v Octrooicentrum Nederland, is the third of today's references to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary reference.

Georgetown's patent claimed a vaccine for the prevention of papillomavirus infection, comprising at least that protein, or fragment thereof, of, among others, HPV‑16, HPV‑18 or HPV‑16 and HPV‑18 together. The patent, granted on 12 December 2007, expired on 23 June 2013.

On 14 December 2007 Georgetown filed eight SPC applications with the Dutch Patent Office ('OCN'), relying on the marketing authorisation (MA) granted to Sanofi Pasteur on 20 September 2006 for the medicinal product Gardasil, containing HPV-6, HPV-11, HPV-16 and HPV-18 purified proteins obtained from yeast cells (Saccharomyces cerevisiae), and on the MA granted to GlaxoSmithKline on 20 September 2007 for the medicinal product Cervarix, containing HPV-16 and HPV-18 purified proteins obtained from insect cells (Trichoplusia ni). Two of those applications concerned the combination of HPV-6, HPV-11, HPV-16 and HPV-18 and the combination of HPV-16 and HPV-18. Four other applications were for SPCs in respect of, respectively, HVP-16, HPV-18, HPV-6 and HPV-11 individually. The two other applications also related to HPV-16 individually and HPV-18 individually.

Two SPC applications were granted but, on 19 May 2010 the SPC application based on the MA granted for Gardasil, which referred to the recombinant L1 protein of the human papillomavirus (HPV) type 16 as the ‘product’ within the meaning of Regulation No 469/2009, was rejected. Said the OCN, the MA which Georgetown relied on related to a medicinal product containing other active ingredients in addition to the recombinant protein of HPV-16. Georgetown appealed against the OCN’s decision to the Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage. That court observed that a rule to the effect that only one SPC may be granted per basic patent could be easily circumvented by the holders of patents protecting several products:  it would be sufficient for such holders to separate their patents in such a way that each basic patent protected only one product, thus enabling them to obtain an SPC for each individual product.  Said Georgetown, it would be prepared to surrender the two SPCs already granted and to withdraw its other pending SPC applications if that enabled it to obtain, in accordance with the Court’s interpretation of Regulation 469/2009, an SPC in respect of HPV‑16.  The Rechtbank’s-Gravenhage was however uncertain whether the surrender of the two SPCs already granted might have retroactive effect. In any event, that court decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) Does Regulation No 469/2009 …, more particularly Article 3(c) thereof, preclude, in a situation where there is a basic patent in force which protects several products, the holder of the basic patent from being granted a certificate for each of the protected products?

(2) If the first question must be answered in the affirmative, how should Article 3(c) of Regulation No 469/2009 be interpreted in the situation where there is one basic patent in force which protects several products and where, at the date of the application for a certificate in respect of one of the products (A) protected by the basic patent, no certificates had yet been granted in respect of other products (B, C) protected by the same basic patent, but where certificates were nevertheless granted in respect of the products (B, C) before a decision was made with regard to the application for a certificate in respect of the first-mentioned product (A)?

(3) Is it significant for the answer to the previous question whether the application in respect of one of the products (A) protected by the basic patent was submitted on the same date as the applications in respect of other products (B, C) protected by the same patent?

(4) If the first question must be answered in the affirmative, may a certificate be granted for a product protected by a basic patent which is in force if a certificate has already been granted for another product protected by the same basic patent, but where the applicant surrenders the latter certificate with a view to obtaining a new certificate on the basis of the same basic patent?

(5) If the issue of whether the surrender has retroactive effect is relevant for the purpose of answering the previous question, is the question of whether surrender has retroactive effect governed by Article 14(b) of Regulation No 469/2009 or by national law? If the question of whether surrender has retroactive effect is governed Article 14(b) of Regulation No 469/2009, should that provision be interpreted to mean that surrender does have retroactive effect?’

This morning the CJEU ruled as follows:

"In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, where, on the basis of a basic patent and a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product consisting of a combination of several active ingredients, the patent holder has already obtained a supplementary protection certificate for that combination of active ingredients, protected by that patent within the meaning of Article 3(a).. , Article 3(c) of that regulation must be interpreted as not precluding the proprietor from also obtaining a supplementary protection certificate for one of those active ingredients which, individually, is also protected as such by that patent".

At [29] to [31] the CJEU observed:

"29  ... the main proceedings concern a ... situation ... in which the same basic patent may be regarded as protecting a number of products within the meaning of Article 3(a) ..., thus raising a different question, namely whether such a patent may permit its holder to obtain several SPCs.

30 In that regard, it is possible, in principle, on the basis of a patent which protects several different ‘products’, to obtain several SPCs in relation to each of those different products, provided, inter alia, that each of those products is ‘protected’ as such by that ‘basic patent’ within the meaning of Article 3(a) ..., and is contained in a medicinal product with an MA.

31 Indeed, the wording of Article 1(b) and Article 3(c) ... does not preclude such an interpretation. That interpretation is also borne out by the objective pursued by that regulation, which, as is apparent from paragraph 11 of the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) of 11 April 1990 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (COM(90) 101 final), is to encourage research in the pharmaceutical sector by granting one SPC per product, a product being understood to mean an active substance in the strict sense. Any other interpretation might, moreover, give rise to circumvention tactics, entailing additional costs which may discourage innovation, in the sense that those concerned would be minded to apply for a separate basic patent for each of their ‘products’".

Super Thursday for SPCs No.2: Eli Lilly v Human Genome Sciences

Case C‑493/12, Eli Lilly and Company Ltd v Human Genome Sciences Inc., a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), was handed down this morning. 

HGS owned European Patent (UK) No 0 939 804, granted on 17 August 2005 and due to expire on 25 October 2016. The patent, which related to the discovery of a new protein, Neutrokine alpha (α), both disclosed and claimed that protein, and also related to antibodies that bind specifically to that protein. Since Neutrokine-α acts as an intercellular mediator in inflammation and immune response, so that too much or too little of it may cause diseases of the immune system, antibodies that bind specifically to it may inhibit its activity and be useful in the treatment of autoimmune diseases.

13 Claims 13, 14 and 18 of this patent read as follows:

‘13. An isolated antibody or portion thereof that binds specifically to:

(a) the full length Neutrokine-α polypeptide (amino acid sequence of residues 1 to 285 of SEQ ID No: 2); or

(b) the extracellular domain of the Neutrokine-α polypeptide (amino acid sequence of residues 73 to 285 of SEQ ID No: 2).

14. The antibody or portion thereof of claim 13 which is selected from the group consisting of:

(a) a monoclonal antibody; ...

18. A pharmaceutical composition comprising … the antibody or portion thereof of any one of claims 13 to 17 and, optionally, a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier.’

Eli Lilly wanted to market a pharmaceutical composition for use in the treatment of autoimmune diseases, containing as its active ingredient an antibody, LY2127399 (Tabalumab), that binds specifically to Neutrokine-α, which Eli Lilly refers to as  (now also known as ). However, it it marketed that composition before the expiry of HGS’s patent, LY2127399 would infringe claim 13 on the basis that LY2127399 was an antibody as defined in claim 13, being an isolated antibody or portion thereof which binds specifically to Neutrokine-α polypeptide. Any pharmaceutical composition containing LY2127399 was thus a pharmaceutical composition as defined in claim 18 of that patent.

Eli Lilly brought an action before the Patents Court, England and Wales, for a declaration that any SPC relying on HGS’ patent and based on a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product containing LY2127399 would be invalid: that antibody was not covered by a ‘basic patent’ within the meaning of Article 3 of Regulation 469/2009, in so far as claim 13 of HGS’s patent was too broadly drafted for it to be possible for that antibody to be regarded as being ‘specified’, for the purpose of the Case C-322/10  Medeva test. Said Eli Lilly, for an SPC to be granted on the basis of HGS’s patent, the patent would have had to contain a structural definition of the active ingredients and the claims would have had to be significantly more specific.

Claim 13 of HGS’s patent was broadly worded, covering a large number of antibodies: the antibody was defined functionally, but not structurally, the definition thus covering an unknown number of otherwise unspecified antibodies, this being the broadest way of claiming an antibody. The patent specification contained no example of an antibody having been made or tested; nor did it contain any structural description of antibodies that might function as therapeutic antibodies. HGS disagreed, pointing out that its form of claim was a standard one that was routinely granted by the European Patent Office (EPO) and that its patent had been held valid in proceedings both before the EPO and in the UK.

The Patents Court decided to stay proceedings and refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) What are the criteria for deciding whether “the product is protected by a basic patent in force” in Article 3(a) of Regulation [No 469/2009]? [the first question posed, but found unnecessary to answer, in Case C-443/12 Actavis v Sanofi, here]

(2) Are the criteria different where the product is not a combination product, and if so, what are the criteria?

(3) In the case of a claim to an antibody or a class of antibodies, is it sufficient that the antibody or antibodies are defined in terms of their binding characteristics to a target protein, or is it necessary to provide a structural definition for the antibody or antibodies, and if so, how much?’

This morning the CJEU ruled as follows:

"Article 3(a) ...  must be interpreted as meaning that, in order for an active ingredient to be regarded as ‘protected by a basic patent in force’ within the meaning of that provision, it is not necessary for the active ingredient to be identified in the claims of the patent by a structural formula. Where the active ingredient is covered by a functional formula in the claims of a patent issued by the European Patents Office, Article 3(a) ... does not, in principle, preclude the grant of a supplementary protection certificate for that active ingredient, on condition that it is possible to reach the conclusion on the basis of those claims, interpreted inter alia in the light of the description of the invention, as required by Article 69 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents and the Protocol on the interpretation of that provision, that the claims relate, implicitly but necessarily and specifically, to the active ingredient in question, which is a matter to be determined by the referring court".

At [42] and [43] the CJEU observed:

"42 As stated in recital 4 in the preamble to Regulation No 469/2009, the purpose of that additional period of exclusivity is to encourage research and, to that end, it is designed to ensure that the investments put into such research are covered.

43 In the light of the objective of Regulation No 469/2009, the refusal of an SPC application for an active ingredient which is not specifically referred to by a patent issued by the EPO relied on in support of such an application may be justified – in circumstances such as those in the main proceedings and as observed by Eli Lilly – where the holder of the patent in question has failed to take any steps to carry out more in-depth research and identify his invention specifically, making it possible to ascertain clearly the active ingredient which may be commercially exploited in a medicinal product corresponding to the needs of certain patients. In such a situation, if an SPC were granted to the patent holder, even though – since he was not the holder of the MA granted for the medicinal product developed from the specifications of the source patent – that patent holder had not made any investment in research relating to that aspect of his original invention, that would undermine the objective of Regulation No 469/2009, as referred to in recital 4 in the preamble thereto".

Super Thursday for SPCs No.1: Actavis v Sanofi

The text that appears below is an amended version of the text posted earlier.

The ruling in Case C‑443/12, Actavis Group PTC EHF, Actavis UK Ltd v Sanofi, Sanofi Pharma Bristol-Myers Squibb SNC intervening, a reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), was handed down this morning.

In short, Sanofi owned European Patent No 0454511 which covered to a family of compounds that included the antihypertensive active ingredient irbesartan. The invention's description also referred to pharmaceutical compositions containing a combination of active ingredients, one of which was a compound in accordance with the invention, whereas the other ingredient or ingredients might be a beta-blocking compound, a calcium antagonist, a diuretic, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory or a tranquiliser. Claims 1 to 7 of the basic patent were based just on irbesartan, or on one of its salts. Claim 20 of the patent related to a pharmaceutical composition containing irbesartan in association with a diuretic -- but no specific diuretic was named either in claim 20 or in the description of the basic patent.  That patent, granted on 17 June 1998, expired on 20 March 2011.

On the basis of that basic patent and marketing authorisations (MAs) granted on 27 August 1997 for the medicinal product Aprovel, which had irbesartan as its single active ingredient and was used principally to treat primary hypertension, Sanofi obtained its first SPC for that active ingredient on 8 February 1999. That certificate expired on 14 August 2012.  Also, on the basis of its basic patent but with MAs granted on 15 October 1998 for the medicinal product CoAprovel, comprising a combination of irbesartan and a diuretic (hydrochlorothyiazide, used to treat primary hypertension), Sanofi obtained a second SPC relating to the irbesartan–hydrochlorothiazide combination: this was granted on 21 December 1999 and expired on 14 October 2013.

According to the summary of the European Public Assessment Report of the European Medicines Agency, the combination of the two active ingredients had an additive effect, reducing the blood pressure more than either medicine alone.  Accordingly curative properties of that combination of active ingredients corresponded to the total therapeutic effect that would otherwise be obtained by separate administration of Aprovel and hydrochlorothiazide. In that regard, the studies of Aprovel used with hydrochlorothiazide as separate tablets were used to support the use of CoAprovel, so that that combination  had no new therapeutic effect when compared with the effects obtained as a result of those two active ingredients being used separately.

Actavis wanted to market generic versions of Aprovel and CoAprovel. However, as a generic medicinal product corresponding to CoAprovel would infringe Sanofi's second SPC, for the irbesartan-hydrochlorothiazide combination, Actavis brought proceedings before the Patents Court, England and Wales, challenging its validity. Said Actavis, Sanofi's second SPC for the combination of irbesartan and hydrochlorothiazide was invalid: that combination was not protected by the basic patent within the meaning of Article 3(a) of Regulation 469/2009 since that combination of active ingredients was not expressly specified or identified in the wording of any of the claims of that patent. No, said Sanofi, that combination was specified or identified in claim 20, which stated that the patent related to a combination of irbesartan and a diuretic -- after all, hydrochlorothiazide was nothing other than a diuretic.  Actavis also relied on Article 3(c) of the same Regulation since that the ‘product’ within the meaning of that provision had already been the subject of an initial SPC. No, said Sanofi: the first SPC and the MAs granted for Aprovel were obtained for the single active ingredient irbesartan, while the second SPC and the MAs for CoAprovel were obtained for a different product --the combination of irbesartan and hydrochlorothiazide.

The Patents Court noted the growing number CJEU rulings on SPCs but considered that it was impossible to resolve the dispute in the main proceedings on the basis of those ruling alone.  This being so, the Court decided to stay proceedings and refer two questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

‘(1) What are the criteria for deciding whether “the product is protected by a basic patent in force” in Article 3(a) of … Regulation No 469/2009?

(2) In a situation in which multiple products are protected by a basic patent in force, does Regulation [No 469/2009], and in particular Article 3(c), preclude the proprietor of the patent being issued a certificate for each of the products protected?’

The CJEU ruled as follows:

"In circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, where, on the basis of a patent protecting an innovative active ingredient and a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product containing that ingredient as the single active ingredient, the holder of that patent has already obtained a supplementary protection certificate for that active ingredient entitling him to oppose the use of that active ingredient, either alone or in combination with other active ingredients, Article 3(c) ... must be interpreted as precluding that patent holder from obtaining – on the basis of that same patent but a subsequent marketing authorisation for a different medicinal product containing that active ingredient in conjunction with another active ingredient which is not protected as such by the patent – a second supplementary protection certificate relating to that combination of active ingredients".

On this basis, said that CJEU at [44]

"In view of the answer given to Question 2, to the effect that a second SPC, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, may not be granted to Sanofi for the irbesartan-hydrochlorothiazide combination, irrespective of whether that combination was protected as such by the basic patent within the meaning of Article 3(a) ..., there is no need to answer Question 1".

In its review of Question 2 the CJEU said, at [31] to 934]:

"31 The SPC is designed simply to re-establish a sufficient period of effective protection of the basic patent by permitting the holder to enjoy an additional period of exclusivity on the expiry of his patent, which is intended to compensate, at least in part, for the delay to the commercial exploitation of his invention by reason of the time which has elapsed between the date on which the application for the patent was filed and the date on which the first MA in the European Union was granted ...

32 In the main proceedings, Sanofi’s patent, which protects the active ingredient irbesartan as such within the meaning of Article 3(a)  ..., has already enabled its holder to obtain an SPC relating to that active ingredient. Moreover, it is common ground that hydrochlorothiazide, an active ingredient that is a member of a class of diuretics, is not protected as such by that patent or indeed by any other patent.

33 In accordance with Article 5 ..., an SPC granted in connection with a product confers, upon the expiry of the basic patent, the same rights as were conferred by that patent in relation to the product, within the limits of the protection conferred by the basic patent, as provided for in Article 4 ... Accordingly, if, during the period in which the patent was valid, the patent holder could oppose, on the basis of his patent, the use or certain uses of his product in the form of a medicinal product consisting of such a product or containing it, the SPC granted in relation to that product would confer on the holder the same rights for all uses of the product, as a medicinal product, which were authorised before the expiry of that certificate ...

34 Thus, in the main proceedings, since it is common ground that, during the period in which the first SPC was valid, Sanofi was entitled to oppose, on the basis of its basic patent, the use or certain uses of irbesartan in the form of a medicinal product consisting of such a product or containing it, the SPC (now expired) granted for that product also conferred on Sanofi the same rights for all uses of the product, as a medicinal product, which were authorised before the expiry of that certificate".

Telmisartan/HCTZ combination: a French appeal

Here, thanks to our good friend and European patent attorney Edouard Kling ("en collaboration avec august & debouzy avocats"), is an English translation of Boehringer Ingelheim v Actavis, a limitation decision (which you can read or download) issued a couple of months ago by the French Court of Appeal which, though French readers are already aware of it, is ripe for spreading to the rest of the SPC Blog community. Edouard explains:

The decision actually relates to some of the previous posts of the Blog:

* first, because it deals with the basic patent and SPC application for the Telmisartan/HCTZ combination product and 

* secondly because it further illustrates the trend among the French jurisdictions to focus on the technical content of the specification and examples when assessing the subject matter disclosed in pharmaceutical patents.

In line with the previous decision of the High Court of Paris which revoked, for insufficiency of disclosure, the basic claim directed to the Irbesartan/Diuretic combinations in the absence of any related example, the Court of Appeal ruled that Boehringer should not be entitled to limit the subject matter of claim 8 to a combination product comprising both Telmisartan and HCTZ. The underlying reason for this was that, even though the specification explicitly teaches that the benzimidazoles of the invention could be administered in combination with a list of additional active ingredients (among which was HCTZ), such combinations should not be part of invention as the patent fails to study and exemplify the effects of these combination therapies. The Court considered that the teaching of the patent was merely speculative.

The readers will probably remember that a different section of the Court of Appeal of Paris decided last year (on June 8, 2012) to confirm the rejection of the SPC application to the combination product regardless of the pending request for limitation of claim 8. Notably the Court had, at the time, already raised concerns about the “hypothetical” combinations envisaged in the specification. The case is currently pending before the Supreme Court, but will most certainly be impacted by this decision.

The original French version of the decision can be read or downloaded.

Curia Fairies busy last night, posting reasoned orders

Luxembourg night-workers ...

Yesterday the SPC Blog posted that it had been asked by a correspondent if we had a text for another reasoned order of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 14 November, Case C-617/12 AstraZeneca AB v Comptroller-General of Patents. This reasoned order was not accessible via the Curia website.

Good news!  The reasoned order must have been uploaded by the Curia Fairies overnight, since it's now available online here. For the record, the CJEU ruled in that order as follows:

"In the context of the European Economic Area (EEA), Article 13(1) of Regulation ... 469/2009 [on SPCs] must be interpreted as meaning that an administrative authorisation issued for a medicinal product by the Swiss Institute for Medicinal Products (SwissMedic), which is automatically recognised in Liechtenstein, must be regarded as the first authorisation to place that medicinal product on the market within the meaning of that provision in the European Economic Area where that authorisation predates marketing authorisations issued for the same medicinal product, either by the European Medicines Agency (EMA), or by the competent authorities of European Union Member States in accordance with the requirements laid down in Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on the Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, and with the requirements of the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway. The fact that, on the basis of similar clinical data, the European Medicines Agency, unlike the Swiss authority, refused to grant a marketing authorisation for that medicinal product at the conclusion of its examination of those data, or the fact that the Swiss authorisation to place the product on the market was suspended by the Swiss Institute for Medicinal Products and subsequently reinstated by the latter only when the holder of the authorisation submitted additional data to it are irrelevant".

Further good news is that the reasoned order in Case C-210/13 Glaxosmithkline is now also miraculously available online. A big thank-you to the Curia Fairies for working their magic spells last night ...

The "Special Mechanism": some 'Merck-y' questions for the CJEU

In April The SPC Blog reported on Merck Canada Inc and another v Sigma Pharmaceuticals plc [2013] EWCA Civ 326, a Court of Appeal for England and Wales reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for preliminary rulings on a number of questions -- not precisely articulated at that time -- on SPCs and the "special mechanism". Case C-539/13 Merck Canada and Merck Sharpe and Dohme.

The UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) is now seeking your opinion as to how these questions should be answered. Writes the IPO:

"We have received notification of a new case referred to the Court of Justice: C-539/13. This is a request for a preliminary ruling in a case concerning the importation into the UK from Poland of a drug by the defendant. The claimant states that the importation of the drug in question was an infringement of the Claimant companies' rights covered by a Supplementary Protection Certificate.

The filing date of the application for the Patent was prior to the date when Poland introduced patent protection for pharmaceutical products under its laws, and the application date for the SPC was before the date when SPCs could be applied for under the laws of Poland.

The questions referred relate to the Specific Mechanism in Chapter 2 of Annex IV to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of (inter alia) the Republic of Poland".

The questions are somewhat cumbersome on account of their interrelationship:

Conditions for reliance upon the Specific Mechanism

1. May the holder, or his beneficiary, of a patent or supplementary protection certificate rely upon his rights under the first paragraph of the Specific Mechanism only if he has first demonstrated his intention to do so?

2. If the answer to Question 1 is yes:

(a) How must that intention be demonstrated?

(b) Is the holder, or his beneficiary, precluded from relying upon his rights with respect to any import or marketing of the pharmaceutical product in a Member State that occurred prior to the demonstration of his intention to rely upon those rights?

The notifier

3. Who must give the prior notification to the holder or beneficiary of a patent or supplementary protection certificate under the second paragraph of the Specific Mechanism? In particular:

(a) Must the prior notification be given by the person intending to import or market the pharmaceutical product?

or

(b) Where, as permitted by the national regulatory system, an application for regulatory approval is made by someone other than the intended importer, can prior notification given by the applicant for regulatory approval be effective if that person does not itself intend to import or market the pharmaceutical product but where the intended importation and marketing will be carried out under the applicant's regulatory approval?; and

(i) Does it make any difference if the prior notification identifies the person that will import or market the pharmaceutical product?

(ii) Does it make any difference if the prior notification is given and the application for regulatory approval is made by one legal person within a group of companies which form a single economic unit, and the acts of importation and marketing are to be carried out by another legal person within that group under licence from the first legal person, but where the prior notification does not identify the legal person that will import or market the pharmaceutical product?

Who should be notified? 

4. To whom must prior notification be given under the second paragraph of the Specific Mechanism? In particular:

(a) Is the beneficiary of a patent or supplementary protection certificate limited to persons who have a legal right under national law to bring proceedings to enforce that patent or supplementary protection certification?

or

(b) In a case where a group of companies forms a single economic unit comprising a number of legal entities, is it sufficient if the notification is addressed to a legal entity which is the operating subsidiary and marketing authorisation holder in the Member State of importation rather than the entity within the group that has a legal right under national law to bring proceedings to enforce that patent or supplementary protection certificate, on the basis either that such legal entity may be characterised as a beneficiary of the patent or SPC. or that it is to be expected that such notification in the ordinary course of events will to come to the attention of the persons who make decisions on behalf of the patent or SPC holder?

(c) If the answer to Question 4(b) is yes, is a notification which is otherwise compliant rendered non-compliant if it is addressed to the "the Manager, Regulatory Affairs" of a company when that company is not the entity within the group that has a legal right under national law to bring proceedings to enforce that patent or supplementary protection certificate but is the operating subsidiary or marketing authorisation holder in the Member State of importation and when that Regulatory Affairs department in practice regularly receives notifications from parallel importers regarding the Specific Mechanism and other matters?

Adds the IPO (if you're still reading after all this!):

"If you would like to comment on this case please email policy@ipo.gov.uk by 27 November 2013. 

We understand how difficult it is to provide detailed comments in the time available. The IPO has tight time limits in which to consider and provide advice to ministers on ECJ cases. In order to help us provide the right advice, we just need a short email by the deadline stating whether you think the UK should intervene and some general points about how you think we should answer the questions.  

You are welcome to follow this email up with more detailed comments after the deadline, which can be taken into consideration if we have chosen to submit observations or if we decide to attend a hearing".

AstraZeneca: another reasoned order. Can you help?

Following today's earlier post with news of Case C-210/13 Glaxosmithline Biologicals SA, Glaxosmithkline Biologicals, Niederlassung der Smithkline Beecham Pharma GmbH & Co. KG v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, The SPC Blog has been asked by a correspondent if we have a text for what appears to be another reasoned order of the Court of Justice of the European Union that was delivered on the same date in Case C-617/12 AstraZeneca AB v Comptroller-General of Patents. Again, the reasoned order does not appear to be accessible via the Curia website.

If any kind reader has a copy of this reasoned order which he or she is willing to share, do please get in touch!

The end of a dream: reasoned order puts paid to SPC hopes for adjuvants

Back in March, Mr Justice Arnold referred two short, succinct questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. Just eight months later we now have, in place of the Advocate General's Opinion and CJEU ruling, what the CJEU calls a "reasoned order". The case in question is Case C-210/13 Glaxosmithline Biologicals SA, Glaxosmithkline Biologicals, Niederlassung der Smithkline Beecham Pharma GmbH & Co. KG v Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks and the questions referred were these:

Is an adjuvant which has no therapeutic effect on its own, but which enhances the therapeutic effect of an antigen when combined with that antigen in a vaccine, an 'active ingredient' within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Regulation 469/2009/EC ?

2. If the answer to question 1 is no, can the combination of such an adjuvant with an antigen nevertheless be regarded as a 'combination of active ingredients' within the meaning of Article 1(b) of Regulation 469/2009/EC?

The answer given in the reasoned order is as follows:

"Article 1(b) ... must be interpreted as meaning that, just as an adjuvant does not fall within the definition of 'active ingredient' within the meaning of that provision, so a combination of two substances, namely an active ingredient having therapeutic effects on its own, and an adjuvant which, while enhancing those therapeutic effects, has no therapeutic effect on its own, does not fall within the definition of 'combination of active ingredients' within the meaning of that provision".

You can read the reasoned order (which is not currently on the Curia website) here or download it here.

Re-revision of patent term extension in Israel

"Revision to the Israel Patent Law Revision Regarding Patent Term Extensions Revised Again" is a short blogpost by Michael Factor (the IP Factor) which you can read here. The blogpost is in English but the proposed amendment to the Israel Patent Law is in Hebrew only, here.

Calculating duration: new UKIPO practice

Further to this weblog's post on some happy news from Mike Snodin (here), the UK Intellectual Property Office has now issued this notice on calculation of the duration of SPCs. The trigger for this is the IPO's recent decision in Genzyme BL O418/13, which you can read in full here.

"Calculation of the duration of a Supplementary Protection Certificate

Issue

1. This Practice Notice outlines a change in practice of the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) as regards the calculation of the duration of a Supplementary Protection Certificate (SPC) where the first authorisation in the Community is one granted by a decision of the European Commission.

Introduction

2. Article 13 of Council Regulation (EC) 469/2009 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products ("the SPC Regulation") sets out how the duration of an SPC may be calculated. Article 13(1) provides that the duration is calculated having regard to the "date of the first authorisation to place the product on the market in the Community", and Article 13(2) provides that the duration of an SPC may not exceed 5 years.

3. In the situation where the earliest authorisation is one granted by a decision of the European Commission following a favourable opinion from the European Medicines Authority, it has been the IPO's practice that the date of the first authorisation in the Community, for the purposes of Article 13(1) of the SPC Regulation, is the date of grant by the European Commission of this European authorisation.

The Practice Change

4. In decision BL O/418/13 (Genzyme Corporation) the hearing officer determined that the duration of the SPC should be rectified (Under Article 17(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1610/96 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 1996 concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products (which recital 17 applies to the SPC regulation) because the date of the first authorisation in the Community, for the purposes of Article 13(1) of the SPC Regulation, should be the date of notification.

5. The date of notification is the date that the applicant for the marketing authorisation is notified of the decision by the European Commission to grant the marketing authorisation and this is the date from which the granted authorisation takes effect. This date is recorded in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU). The date of notification is often a few days later than the date of grant of the marketing authorisation. As a consequence, when Article 13(1) is applied the duration of the SPC based on the authorisation date may be correspondingly longer (unless it exceeds the limit of 5 years provided for in Article 13(2)).

6. We will now calculate SPC duration in accordance with this decision. This may also affect the dates, but not the duration, of related paediatric extensions (Under Article 13(3) of the SPC Regulation and Article 36 of Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006).

The Procedure

7. This change will affect applications for SPCs, granted SPCs and paediatric extensions to SPCs.

SPC Applications

8. To amend a SPC application you should:

a. write to the comptroller, for the attention of the examiner, either when a response to an official action comes due, or in a separate letter; and

b. provide the number of the SPC and a copy of the relevant entry in the OJEU which shows the date of notification of the European marketing authorisation entered at item 8 of Form SP1.

9. The IPO will acknowledge receipt and notify you of the amended maximum expiry accordingly.

Granted SPCs

10. To rectify the term of a granted SPC you should:

a. write to the comptroller, for the attention of the examiner; and

b. provide the number of the SPC and a copy of the relevant entry in the OJEU which shows the date of notification of the European marketing authorisation entered at item 8 of Form SP1.

11. The IPO will issue a corrected version of the SPC certificate and extension certificate as necessary; publish the correction in the Patents Journal; and amend the Register entry for the basic patent to reflect the change.

Paediatric Extensions 

12. To amend the dates of an extension you should mention the extension when you write to the IPO about the granted SPC or application.  

13. The IPO will then ensure the necessary steps are taken to amend the dates in line with our practice set out above".

Genzyme translation: problem solved!

Within a very short time of posting this plea for a copy of the English-language version of the Dutch Genzyme decision, a copy miraculously found its way to The SPC Blog, from Kathryn Nicholls (Mewburn & Ellis)) via Edward Oates (Carpmaels & Ransford LLP). Thanks, Kathryn and Ed!

Readers can access the translated judgment here or download it here.

Genzyme: lost (in) translation: can you help?

One of our readers is looking for an “old” decision on SPC/medical devices -- Genzyme Biosurgery Corp v Industrial Property Office, BIE 70 (2002) 360-362 (Netherlands) DC (the Hague); Rechtsbank 's-Gravenhage, AWB 02/1729 OCT.

This decision was originally available on this weblog but the link to a now defunct storage site doesn't work and we've lost the English translation. If any reader by any chance has a copy of that translation, can he or she please let us have sight of it so that we can make it available again.  Thanks in anticipation!

SPC Regulations and transitional regime: a new article

From our friend and reader Dimitar Batalkiev comes the following message. Writes Dimitar:

"I would like to share with the readers of The SPC Blog information of a recently published article on the transitional regime of the SPC regulations in the IIC journal [a learned and respected title published by the Max-Planck-Institute]. It discusses the rationale and structure of the provisions concerning the initial entry into force of Council Regulation 1768/92, the subsequent enlargement of the EU and the conflict with existing national regimes for extended patent protection. The analysis of the Community legislation is carried out in the light of the national law of the Member States and the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

The article is also available online through this link".

Thanks, Dimitar, for letting us know.  If you are not an IIC subscriber and pursue the link, you can purchase access to this article via Springer.com for $39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95 (though the final gross prices may vary according to local VAT).

SPCs, drug costs, evidence and proof: can you help?

The SPC Blog has received a request for information from David Verbeeten, PhD (Cantab). David, a Research Associate, Health Innovation, Policy and Evaluation, The Conference Board of Canada, Ottawa, wonders whether any of those kind souls who contribute to this weblog are aware of evidence as to the effects of SPCs effects on European drug prices since their implementation in the early 1990s. He also asks:

"Have drug costs gone up as a result of this mechanism? Is there any definitive proof? Are there studies that have looked into this question?"

This blogger isn't immediately aware of such statistics, but he finds it difficult to imagine that an industry sector as closely monitored and regulated as the pharmaceutical sector, and as closely scrutinised by the competition authorities, could have gone from the early 1990s until now without there being quantities of evidence, both from the two sides of industry and from third parties, to which David might profitably be pointed. If you have a handy reference or weblink to any helpful data, please post it as a comment beneath this blog post -- together with any pertinent comments you may have as to their currency, veracity or objectivity.

Georgetown Opinion: now in English too

Yesterday The SPC Blog posted this item on the Opinion of the Advocate General in Case C-484/12 Georgetown University v Octrooicentrum Nederland, acting under the name NL Octrooicentrum.

Unfortunately the Opinion was available on the Curia in a wonderful selection of languages -- but not English.  Now, thanks to Mary Smillie (Rouse), we have an unofficial English translation prepared by her colleagues. You can read it here.

Georgetown: Advocate General Jääskinen advises the CJEU

The Opinion of Advocate General Niilo Jääskinen (right) in the Dutch reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Union in Case C-484/12 Georgetown University v Octrooicentrum Nederland, acting under the name NL Octrooicentrum  was posted on the Curia website this morning, but at the time of this blogpost was not yet available in English.

The referring court asked the following five questions:

"Question 1

In the situation that a basic patent in force protects several products, does regulation 469/2009 […], more specifically article 3, preamble and under c thereof, preclude the grant of a certificate for each of the protected products to the holder of the basic patent?

Question 2

If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative, how should article 3, preamble and under c of the Regulation be interpreted in the situation wherein a basic patent in force protects several products and on the date of the application for a certificate for one of the products protected by the basic patent (A), other products protected by the basic patent (B,C) have not already been the subject of a certificate, however, certificates on the applications for those products (B,C) have been granted before the application for a certificate for the first product (A) has been decided on?

Question 3

Is it important, when answering the previous question, whether the application for one of the products protected by the basic patent (A) has been submitted on the same date as the applications for other products (B,C) protected by the same basic patent?

Question 4

If the first question is to be answered in the affirmative, can a certificate be granted for a product protected by the basic patent in force, if another product protected by the basic patent has already been the subject of a certificate, but the holder of the certificate surrenders this last-named certificate with the intention to be granted a new certificate based on the same basic patent?

Question 5

Is it important, when answering the previous question, whether the surrender has retrospective effect, and is the question whether the surrender has retrospective effect determined by article 14, preamble and under b of the Regulation, or is it determined by national law? In the event that the question whether surrender has retrospective effect is determined by article 14, preamble and under b of the Regulation, should that provision be taken to mean that surrender has retrospective effect?""

As for the first question

"7. Given the jurisprudence of the Court and the Advocate General Trstenjak in the cases which gave rise to the judgments in Medeva and Georgetown University and Others, the Court is already sufficient information to respond to said first question. Thus, in this case, it is appropriate to conclude only the second to fifth questions, which are unpublished. In addition, it should be noted that these four questions were asked by the court only if the answer to the first question is yes, which is the premise presented in 1 of these conclusions".

The Advocate General has advised the Court to rule as follows (thanks to Google Translate):

"I propose that the Court reply as follows to the second to fifth questions referred by the Court in 's-Gravenhage (Netherlands)

(1) A waiver of the supplementary protection certificate is governed by Article 14 b) of Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 concerning the supplementary protection certificate for drugs, not by national law. In addition, when such waiver is effective only for the future, it may not subsequently be admitted that, as a result of such waiver, the product in question had never been to a certificate within the meaning of Article 3 c) of that Regulation.

(2) In the event that an applicant has filed several supplementary protection certificate for separate products but covered by the same patent, it is up to him to decide which of these applications is a priority. In the absence of choice, it is up to national authorities to draw the consequences under national law".

Watch this space for comment and analysis, which is bound to be forthcoming.

Canada opts for "SPC-type" protection under CTEU

From our good friend Martijn de Lange at the Netherlands Patent Office comes news from afar. He tells us that there has been an interesting development in Canada, where "SPC-type" protection will be introduced there as a consequence of the CTEU, the recently-concluded free trade agreement between Canada and the European Union. See here for some further information.

The full text of the CTEU does not yet seem to be available, but a bit more information on this pact can be found here.

More on SPCs in Cyprus

On 28 October this blog asked for information concerning the theory and practice of SPC filing in Cyprus. A comment outlining practice was posted beneath this piece by Eleni Chrysostomides and Alexandros Georgiades (Dr. K. Chrysostomides & Co LLC).  The following information, from Despina Morgianni (Assistant Examiner) has now been forwarded to us by martin Paltnoi (MPA Business Services Ltd) 

"When an SPC application is filed at our Office based on a patent which is valid in Cyprus (European or national), a notification of the application is published in Cyprus Official Gazette. The same applies when a certificate is granted.
 Unfortunately, there is not an online searching system for public inspection on patents registries in Cyprus. However, a search can be made locally at our office premises, either by you or by an authorized third person, but the information received will be in Greek language. Please note that inspection is only allowed for Granted patents and SPCs and not for those which are still pending applications".

 Thanks for your responses!

Valid MAs, Centralised MAs and the date of notification: extra days up for grabs?

The SPC Blog has received a cheerful note from Mike Snodin (who now heads Pharma & Nutrition at Avidity IP). What brings such good cheer? Mike has been working hard to talk the UK Intellectual Property Office round to his point of view, with some success.  Writes Mike:

By way of a decision issued on 22 October 2013 (BL O/418/13), the hearing officer, Dr Lawrence Cullen, essentially agreed with Mike’s arguments that:

(i)         Article 3(b) of Regulation 469/2009 requires there to be a valid Marketing Authorisation (MA) in force;

(ii)         following the CJEU’s decision in Case C-127/00 (Hässle AB), Article 13(1) must be interpreted as referring to the same type of MA as Article 3(b) (i.e. a valid MA); and

(iii)        for a “centralised” MA (from the European Commission / EMA) the earliest date that the MA becomes valid is the date of notification of the European Commission’s decision to the applicant.

This development follows similar arguments first proposed by Mike in his October 2011 article in SCRIP Regulatory Affairs (as reported here in this blog).

Longer SPC Term

As a result of the decision, longer term should now be available in the UK for those SPCs where:

(a)        the earliest marketing authorisation (MA) in the European Economic Area is a “centralised” MA issued by the European Commission (EC); and

(b)        less than 10 years have elapsed between the filing of the basic patent and the date of the EC’s decision to grant a MA.

The number of SPCs potentially affected is significant.  For example, longer exclusivity could now be available for over 140 human or veterinary medicinal products.  Further, the percentage of SPCs that could benefit from longer term appears to have significantly increased in recent years.  For example, for SPCs filed to date in the UK in 2013, over 40% could gain additional days of term.

For affected SPCs, the additional term that will now be obtainable in the UK is typically in the region of 2 to 4 days.  However, research conducted by Mike has identified numerous examples of SPCs in the UK for which the additional term would be longer than this, even in excess of 1 week (or, in one instance, in excess of 2 weeks).

At least for granted SPCs, positive action by proprietors will be necessary in order for them to benefit from the additional term now available.

Implications for filing deadline

Where the MA for the UK is a “centralised” MA, the deadline mentioned in Article 7(1) should now be interpreted as meaning 6 months from the date of notification of the “centralised” MA.  This (later) deadline ought not to be relied upon outside of the UK unless and until practice of the national patent offices becomes completely harmonised on this point.

Euratom

As an aside, Mike advises that he personally has not given up on trying to persuade patent offices such as the UK IPO to accept further arguments based upon provisions of the Euratom treaty - though such arguments were not accepted on this occasion.  If they had been, they could have provided an additional day of SPC term for almost all UK SPCs where (a) and (b) above are true.

CJEU rules on status of emergency MAs in SPC applications

Case C‑210/12, Sumitomo Chemical Co. Ltd v Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt, is a decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union on a reference for a preliminary ruling from the German Bundespatentgericht. What was this case about?

Sumitomo was the proprietor of European patent EP 0 376 279, DE 689 06 668, which covered Germany among other countries. The patent was for the active substance clothianidin, used for insecticide products. Back in February 2003 the United Kingdom authorities issued a marketing authorisation (‘MA’) to a company in the Bayer group, in accordance with Article 8(1) of Directive 91/414, for a product containing clothianidin. That ‘provisional’ MA was the first issued in the European Union for a product containing that active substance. In December of the same year the German authorities, on the basis of the national provisions transposing Article 8(4) of Directive 91/414, issued an emergency MA to a company in the Bayer group for a plant protection product containing the active substance clothianidin. That emergency MA was valid for 120 days, from 15 January to 13 May 2004.

On 14 May 2004, Sumitomo applied to the German patent office for a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products. In its application Sumitomo referred to (i) the provisional MA granted in the UK in February 2003, this being the first MA granted in the European Union, and (ii) to the emergency MA issued in Germany in December 2003. In September 2004 the German authorities granted, on the basis of the national provisions transposing Article 8(1) of Directive 91/414, a provisional MA to a company in the Bayer group for a product based on clothianidin. The period of validity of that provisional MA was from 8 September 2004 until 7 September 2007. In November 2004 Sumitomo informed the German patent office of the existence of the provisional MA of 8 September 2004.

The German patent office eventually, in January 2006, dismissed Sumitomo's SPC application. Although the application had been lodged within the period set out in Article 7(1) of Regulation 1610/96, the German patent office considered that no SPC could be granted since the MA -- being an emergency MA which had expired -- was no longer valid within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation 1610/96. Sumitomo appealed to the Bundespatentgericht, which decided to refer to the CJEU the following questions for a preliminary ruling:

‘1. Is Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 1610/96] to be interpreted as not precluding the grant of a supplementary protection certificate for a plant protection product if a valid marketing authorisation was granted in accordance with Article 8(4) of [Directive 91/414]?

2. If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative:

Is it necessary under Article 3(1)(b) of [Regulation No 1610/96] for the marketing authorisation to be still in force at the time of application for the certificate?

3. If the answer to Question 1 is in the negative:

Is Article 7(1) of [Regulation No 1610/96] to be interpreted as meaning that an application can be lodged even before the period mentioned in that provision starts to run?’

Earlier this month the CJEU ruled as follows:

1. Article 3(1)(b) of Regulation ... 1610/96 ... concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for plant protection products must be interpreted as precluding the issue of a supplementary protection certificate for a plant protection product in respect of which an emergency marketing authorisation has been issued under Article 8(4) of Directive 91/414 ... concerning the placing of plant protection products on the market, as amended....

2. Articles 3(1)(b) and 7(1) of Regulation No 1610/96 must be interpreted as precluding an application for a supplementary protection certificate being lodged before the date on which the plant protection product has obtained the marketing authorisation referred to in Article 3(1)(b) of that regulation.

Thanks go to Tony Breen (Syngenta) for drawing our attention to this decision.